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 In explaining the causes of humanitarian interventions, constructivism, an emerging 
international relations theory, emphasizes the power of humanitarian norms in prompting states 
to respond to humanitarian crises.  Realism, in contrast, contends that norms have little influence; 
security and material interests drive foreign policy.  These schools of thought are at an impasse. 
While it is clear that states have undertaken interventions to protect human rights and end crimes 
against humanity, it is also clear that states often forego humanitarian intervention when wide-
scale atrocities are being committed.  The purpose of this project is to examine when norms 
matter by identifying the conditions under which states are likely to intervene for humanitarian 
reasons.  I will do this by looking at US decision-making during crises in Somalia, Darfur, and 
Libya.  By doing this, I will attempt to bridge the gap between constructivism and realism by 
specifying precisely when norms matter enough to compel state action and when their influence 
is insufficient. 
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Introduction: 
Humanitarian Intervention and the United Nations: 
 While the international community has begun to play an increasingly active role in 
condemning humanitarian violations since the end of the Cold War, the “right to live norm” has 
been around for decades.  The 1948 Universal Declaration of Human Rights stated that 
“everyone has the right to life, liberty, and security of person,” and the 1949 Geneva Convention 
further reiterated this point by outlining humanitarian protections of civilians in war.1  The 
growing power of international humanitarian and human rights law indicates a change in 
perceptions of the responsibilities of governments that has only gotten stronger since the fall of 
the Berlin Wall.  Thomas Weiss explains that this emergence of UN humanitarian intervention in 
the post-Cold War world can be attributed to the end of a bipolar international system.  During 
the Cold War the UN displayed hesitancy to side with either superpower, fearing that a larger 
conflict could erupt from any intervention in both internal and international armed conflicts.  
When interventions did occur in internal crises they often came in the form of a unilateral 
intervention, such as the United States in Vietnam, or as a U.N. mission authorized under 
Chapter VI, which requires the consent of the belligerents and emphasized peaceful settlements.  
With the United States emerging as the global hegemon in a unipolar world, greater legitimacy 
was given to intervention in domestic affairs as “the definition of international peace and security 
was continually expanded to include very domestic actions.”2 Not only was intervention seen as 
legitimate, but the UN began to sanction the use of military force through Chapter VII 
interventions if there was a perceived threat to international security.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  1	  The	  Universal	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights:	  Article	  3.”	  Last	  modified	  May	  5,	  2013,	  http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/	  2	  Thomas	  Weiss,	  Humanitarian	  Intervention	  (Polity,	  2012),	  45	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 The responsibility of humanitarian intervention was further expanded with the 2005 
Responsibility to Protect Initiative (R2P).  While sovereignty had been the prevailing norm 
defining international relations since the Treaty of Westphalia, R2P challenged this by making 
sovereignty conditional.3  According to Gareth Evans in his “When is it Right to Fight,” the UN 
explicitly asserted that sovereignty is a responsibility, not a right, and that states should intervene 
and act accordingly when there are mass atrocity crimes.4  In other words, R2P suggested that 
norms could influence state behavior.5  However, the trends in humanitarian intervention have 
not always supported this assumption.  For example, since the end of the Cold War states have 
intervened to uphold humanitarian norms in crises such as Cambodia, Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, 
and Libya.  Each of these interventions had objectives ranging from alleviating food shortages to 
ending violence and genocide.  However, states have also been recalcitrant to the humanitarian 
norm in cases such as East Timor, Rwanda, and Darfur.  Why does this inconsistency occur? 
Before continuing, it is necessary to first answer a very important question: what exactly 
is humanitarian intervention?  While many scholars disagree over a singular definition of the 
term, most agree on the following three characteristics: 1) A military force is utilized, 2) the 
force is sent into a sovereign body that has not “committed international aggression against 
another state (at least directly), and 3) the intervention has humanitarian motives that are 
independent from the intervening state’s self-interest.6  Humanitarian intervention is also statist 
in nature; it involves a state actor (or group of states) making decisions and executing them 
within other states. According to this definition, a non-governmental organization assisting with 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  3	  Indeed,	  there	  have	  long	  been	  challenges	  to	  sovereignty,	  and	  even	  the	  UN	  Declaration	  of	  Human	  Rights	  and	  other	  treaties	  constrain	  it.	  	  However,	  R2P	  was	  about	  sanctioning	  the	  use	  of	  force	  for	  enforcement,	  whereas	  others	  were	  more	  about	  obligations	  that	  states	  should	  recognize.	  	  	  4	  Gareth	  Evans,	  “When	  is	  it	  Right	  to	  Fight?”	  Survival	  46.3	  (2004):	  59-­‐81	  5	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  R2P	  is	  itself	  a	  norm	  and	  not	  legally	  binding.	  	  The	  presumption	  is	  that	  the	  R2P	  norm	  itself	  will	  guide	  state	  behavior.	  	  	  6	  Alton	  Frye,	  Humanitarian	  Intervention:	  Crafting	  a	  Workable	  Doctrine.	  (New	  York:	  Council	  on	  Foreign	  Relations,	  2000)	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clean-water initiatives in Sudan would not constitute a humanitarian intervention, nor would the 
United States sending monetary aid to Greece during the Cold War.  These could be considered 
attempts to alleviate a humanitarian crisis, but they are not in themselves humanitarian 
interventions.  I will use the above definition for the purpose of this project, which will examine 
the conditions under which states agree to intervene in humanitarian crises.   
Theoretical Explanations of State Behavior: 
 This project will examine why states intervene in humanitarian crises from a practical 
standpoint, with the ultimate goal of filling the gap between the existing theoretical explanations 
of state behavior.  The three dominant theoretical paradigms that are used to explain why states 
undertake interventions are realism, liberalism, and constructivism.  Since liberalism is most 
useful to describe democracy promotion and establishing economic interdependence, and many 
humanitarian interventions do not have these objectives, it is not particularly useful for the 
purpose of this study.7  However, constructivism and realism both provide explanations of state 
decision-making in humanitarian crises.   
 With historical roots that date back to the writings of Thucydides, realism argues that 
states operate first and foremost according to their own self-interests.  Most commonly, these 
interests refer to enhancing one’s security in relation to other states.  In his essay “Intervention in 
Historical Perspective,” the historian Marc Trachtenberg suggests that interventions are primarily 
used by a state to either maintain the status quo, or expand its own power.  Both of these 
objectives are rooted in increasing a state’s security, which realists see as the main concern that 
shapes state behavior.  For example, referencing the restraints put on Germany following World 
War I and the intervention in the Rhineland, Trachtenberg explains that this occurred “to provide 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  7	  Certainly,	  some	  humanitarian	  interventions	  are	  geared	  toward	  democracy	  promotion,	  or	  have	  economic	  goals,	  yet	  many	  humanitarian	  interventions	  clearly	  do	  not	  pursue	  democratization	  (ie.	  Somalia,	  Kosovo,	  Libya).	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for European security- to protect Germany from once again becoming a threat to the peace.”8  
While his paper primarily focuses on when interventions are considered “legitimate,” his 
assertion that states intervene largely for security reasons is essential for understanding why 
states do or do not participate in humanitarian interventions.  According to Trachtenberg’s 
argument, if a humanitarian intervention does not offer a means to enhancing one’s security, the 
state will not take it.  Similarly, a state will not undertake a humanitarian intervention if it has 
negative security implications.    
 Why are states so concerned with maximizing their own security?  As the realist John 
Mearsheimer posits, the anarchic nature of the international system gives states reason to fear the 
actions of competitors. Because there is no overarching authority to restrict state behavior, states 
therefore have incentive to maximize their power and seek hegemony in order to ensure their 
own security.9  Other realists such as Robert Jervis explain that when states maximize their 
security, their competitors respond by doing the same.  Each state perceives the other’s actions as 
hostile, which initiates a spiral dynamic known as the “security dilemma."10 This dynamic is 
perhaps best exemplified by the arms race between the US and USSR, during which each state’s 
attempts to increase its security inadvertently increased the chance of war.  It is evident that 
according to realism, norms and values hold little weight in influencing state behavior.     
 An important subdivision of realism is the concept of realpolitik, which explains that 
states first and foremost seek “the continuation or survival of the state as an independent 
entity.”11 According to realpolitik, strategic and material interests dominate state decision-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  8	  Marc	  Trachtenberg,	  “Intervention	  in	  Historical	  Perspective,”	  in	  Emerging	  Norms	  of	  Justified	  Intervention,	  ed.	  Laura	  W.	  Reed	  and	  Carl	  Kaysen.	  (Cambridge:	  American	  Academy	  of	  Arts	  and	  Sciences,	  1993),	  15-­‐36.	  	  9	  John	  Mearsehimer,	  The	  Tragedy	  of	  Great	  Power	  Politics,	  (New	  York:	  Norton,	  2001),	  29-­‐54	  10	  Robert,	  Jervis	  “Cooperation	  under	  the	  Security	  Dilemma.”	  World	  Politics	  30.2	  (January,	  1978):	  167-­‐214.	  11	  Frederic	  S.	  Pearson,	  Robert	  A.	  Baumann.,	  and	  Jeffrey	  J.	  Pickering,	  “Military	  Intervention	  and	  Realpolitik”	  in	  
Reconstructing	  Realpolitik,	  ed.	  Frank	  Whelon	  and	  Francis	  Diehl.	  (Ann	  Arbor:	  University	  of	  Michigan,	  1994)	  206.	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making, and intervention is a strategy that “entails reaching into another sovereign state’s 
territory to change or rectify conditions considered unacceptable to the intervener.”12  A study 
conducted by Pearson, Baumann, and Pickering shows that states generally base their policy on 
power rather than ideals and norms, indicating the importance of security and strategic concerns 
in intervention.  This falls in line with traditional realist thinkers, such as Hans Morgenthau and 
John Mearsheimer who see power and domination as dynamic forces shaping foreign policy. 
However, realpolitik completely ignores the reality of humanitarian intervention and normative 
behavior that has increased in the years since the study was conducted.  While realists believe 
states act according to a “logic of consequences” rationale (rationally assessing the costs and 
benefits of every action), it does not explain why states sometimes undertake extremely costly 
interventions when the benefits seem to be insignificant or completely absent.   
 In contrast, humanitarian norms pressure states to act according to a “logic of 
appropriateness.”  James Marsh and Johan Olsen describe this as “following internationalized 
prescriptions of what is socially defined as…right or good, without…calculation of 
consequences and expected utility.”13  This explanation of state behavior echoes the theory of 
constructivism, made famous by Alexander Wendt in 1992, which posits that state interests and 
behavior reflect shared norms and values rather than inherent material benefits.  In her book The 
Purpose of Intervention: Changing Beliefs about the Use of Force, Martha Finnemore points out 
the shortcomings of realism in explaining humanitarian intervention.  She argues “realists would 
expect to see some geostrategic or political advantage to be gained by intervening states…these 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  12	  Pearson,	  Baumann,	  and	  Pickering,	  “Realpolitik,”	  205	  13	  James	  Marsh,	  and	  Johan	  Olsen,	  “The	  Logic	  of	  Appropriateness”	  in	  The	  Oxford	  Handbook	  of	  Public	  Policy,	  ed.	  Michael	  Moran,	  Michael	  Rein,	  and	  Robert	  E.	  Gooden.	  (Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2006).	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are hard to find in most post-1989 cases.”14  Thus, according to constructivism, there must be 
some motivation other than self- interest that brings about intervention, such as promoting 
equality and self-determination, or promoting human rights.  While this explains why 
humanitarian interventions occur, it does not explain why states sometimes do not intervene even 
when human rights are being blatantly violated, thus not upholding what is socially defined as 
“good and right.”  To be sure, constructivists concede that there are other factors that influence 
state behavior along with human rights norms: “humanitarianism competes with (or 
complements) other incentives states might have to intervene…all interventions are prompted by 
a mixture of motivations in some way…15 The important question to answer is under what 
conditions do norms constitute the principle motivation for intervention, and under what 
conditions will norms be ignored because of other interests.  Sometimes, for example, states will 
intervene because of human rights norms, but other factors such as strategic or security concerns, 
or financial costs, can hinder a response.  
Hypothesis: 
 In this paper, I will attempt to bridge the gap between these theories by specifying 
precisely when norms matter enough to compel state action in humanitarian crises, and when 
their influence is insufficient.   This study will focus primarily on U.S. decision-making in the 
Somalia Crisis (1991-1993), the Darfur Conflict (mid-2000s), and the Libyan War (2011).  
Utilizing what John Gerring refers to as a "crucial case," my study aims to compare three cases 
that fit closely to my theory.16  For instance, Somalia and Libya are two crises in which the US 
chose to intervene despite the lack of apparent security or material interests.  This seems to be an 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  14	  Martha	  Finnemore,	  The	  Purpose	  of	  Intervention:	  Changing	  Belief	  of	  the	  Use	  of	  Force.	  (New	  York:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  2004).	  461	  	  15	  Ibid.,	  462	  16	  John	  Gerring,	  “Is	  there	  a	  (Viable)	  Crucial-­‐Case	  Method?,”	  Comparative	  Political	  Studies	  40.3	  (2007):	  231-­‐53.	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"easy" case for constructivism to explain, as the conventional view is that norms influenced 
behavior, but a difficult case for realism given the lack of a security motive. By the same token, 
Darfur was a case in which the US failed to act, despite Colin Powell recognizing that genocide 
was underway.  This should be an easy case for realism to explain, but a much harder case for 
constructivism.   If my theory is to bridge the gap between realism and constructivism it should 
be able to explain these cases by identifying the conditions under which norms matter.  
Additionally, the three crises span three different decades, allowing me to demonstrate that my 
hypotheses are not era-dependent.   
 As with any study, it is imperative that my variables are strictly defined.  George and 
Bennett advise researchers to approach data collection using the method of “structured, focused 
comparison” with clearly defined variables to ensure standardized data collection.17 My research 
suggests that there are three conditions that must be fulfilled before the U.S. intervenes: 1) there 
must be a presence of global civil society providing information and political pressure to 
intervene, 2) the material costs of intervention must be relatively low, and 3) the intervention 
must not compromise the security/strategic interests of the U.S. The existence of all three 
conditions as a set should lead to my dependent variable: the occurrence of humanitarian 
intervention.  To improve clarity, I devised a chart to represent the decision-making process to 
intervene in humanitarian crises (on following page).    
This chart illustrates the considerations of the U.S. when deciding to intervene in 
humanitarian crises.  It demonstrates the catalyst role that global civil society plays in putting the 
crisis on the agenda, and the material and strategic costs that the U.S. must consider before 
deciding to intervene.  According to my hypothesis, if and only if all three of the conditions 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  George,	  Alexander	  L.,	  and	  Andrew	  Bennett.	  "The	  Method	  of	  Structured,	  Focused	  Comparison."	  Case	  Studies	  
and	  Theory	  Development	  in	  the	  Social	  Sciences.	  (Cambridge:	  MIT	  Press,	  2005)	  67-­‐72.	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above are fulfilled will intervention occur.  The fulfillment of all three conditions is thus 











Description of Conditions: 
The Role of Global Civil Society and NGOs: 
 Global civil society describes the network of non-state actors and groups and the role 
they play in international governance.18  Individuals, households, businesses and corporations, 
coalitions, and the media all fall under the umbrella of global civil society.19  One of the most 
prominent actors in global civil society that has surfaced in recent years, and upon which this 
study will greatly focus, are non-governmental organizations.  “The evidence is mounting,” 
argue Nelson and Dorsey, that non-governmental organizations (NGOs) can influence, and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  18	  John	  Keane	  and	  G.	  John	  Ikenberry,	  “Global	  Civil	  Society?,”	  Foreign	  Affairs	  (2003)	  accessed	  March	  3,	  2014	  http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59214/g-­‐john-­‐ikenberry/global-­‐civil-­‐society	  19	  John	  Keane,	  Global	  Civil	  Society?,	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2003),	  8	  
Con	  1:	  Strong	  global	  civil	  society	  providing	  information	  and	  pressure	  to	  intervene	  Catalyst	  for	  U.S.	  concern	  
Con	  2:	  Low	  relative	  material	  costs	  
Con	  3:	  Benign	  security	  and	  strategic	  implications	  Consideration	  of	  costs	  of	  intervention	  
Fig	  1-­‐	  U.S.	  Decision-­‐making	  in	  Humanitarian	  Crises	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sometimes even change, state policy.20  The emergence of NGOs in international governance has 
altered the international system itself, marking a change from a completely state-centric 
understanding of IR to one in which non and sub-state groups challenge the interests and policies 
of state governments.  NGOs claim to represent the interests of non-government actors, and push 
forward selfless ideas of what is good and right that might otherwise be ignored by states.  The 
actual influence of NGOs is a matter of contention, however. Some academics such as Lucy Ford 
optimistically claim that NGOs and global civil society are catalysts of transnational movements 
that guide socio-cultural change and play prominent roles in international governance.21  This 
pluralist view sees Westphalian sovereignty as declining, and humanitarian intervention as a 
manifestation of this development.  Globalist and realist views, in contrast, maintain that the 
state is the primary actor in international governance, and that humanitarian NGOs are either an 
organ of the UN and human rights regimes or are completely powerless without working through 
the state.22 As I will demonstrate in this paper, a realist view ignores the pervasive influence and 
dynamic character of NGOs.  The U.S. generally does not intervene in humanitarian crises unless 
NGOs, and global civil society at large, perform two important functions: provide the state with 
important information about the conflict, and pressure it to act.   
 Keck and Sikkink are perhaps the most widely studied academics of global civil society 
and its role in transnational advocacy networks.  In their book Activists Beyond Borders, they 
argue that such networks “use the power of their information, ideas, and strategies to alter the 
information and value contexts within which states make policies.”23  They do this through four 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  20	  Paul	  J.	  Nelson	  and	  Ellen	  Dorsey,	  New	  Rights	  Advocacy:	  Changing	  Strategies	  of	  Development	  and	  Human	  
Rights	  NGOs,	  (Washington	  D.C.:	  Georgetown	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  26	  21	  Lucy	  Ford,	  “Transnational	  Actors,”	  in	  Global	  Environmental	  Politics:	  Concepts,	  Theories,	  and	  Case	  Studies,	  ed.	  Gabriela	  Kutting	  (London:	  Routledge,	  2011)	  22	  Nelson	  and	  Dorsey,	  New	  Rights	  Advocacy,	  37	  23	  Margaret	  E.	  Keck	  and	  Kathryn	  Sikkink,	  Activists	  Beyond	  Borders:	  Advocacy	  Networks	  in	  International	  Politics	  (Ithaca:	  Cornell	  University	  Press,	  1998),	  16	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primary tactics: information politics, symbolic politics, leverage politics, and accountability 
politics.  Through information politics, transnational advocacy groups provide states with 
important information and direct it toward the areas in government where it will be most 
influential.  Such information can be of particular use when states are unwilling to invest their 
own resources in researching a humanitarian crisis, or when existing reports are impartial and 
ignore the true roots of the problem.  Symbolic politics “call upon symbols, actions, or stories 
that make sense of a situation to an audience that is frequently far away.”24  An example of this 
would be using media outlets to convey a humanitarian crisis to the population of a powerful 
state with the intent of generating sufficient public interest in addressing the problem.  Leverage 
politics aims to call upon powerful actors within a network when weaker members lack adequate 
influence.  Finally, accountability politics describes the effort to lead states to act upon the norms 
or principles that they have previously advocated for.  Understanding these four tactics is 
extremely important for understanding how NGOs and global civil society as a whole operate.  
They demonstrate both the informational and advocacy roles that non-state actors play in 
influencing state behavior, and the methods that are used to accomplish this.   
 Taking the dynamic and pervasive nature of global civil society into account, and the 
hesitancy to intervene in humanitarian crises that has been historically evident in U.S. decision-
making, I predict that the U.S. will not intervene in humanitarian crises unless there is a strong 
global civil society network providing the U.S. with information of the crisis and pressuring it to 
intervene.   
The Role of Costs 
 Material costs are heavily weighed by states when considering an action, and as 
Benjamin Valentino explains, “military intervention is a particularly expensive way to save 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  24	  Keck	  and	  Sikkink,	  Activists	  Beyond	  Borders,16	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lives.”25  Realism posits that states only act according to their self-interest.  Thus, if states are to 
incur material costs through humanitarian intervention, and receive little if any benefit, there 
should be little incentive to intervene.  Yet there have been many instances of humanitarian 
intervention over the past couple decades.  Why is this?  How do these instances differ from 
scenarios where the U.S. does not intervene? 
 One good way to approach this question is to look at opportunity costs foregone of 
different interventions.  Opportunity costs is an economic term that, in the context of 
humanitarian intervention, describes “the foregone opportunities to which the resources for a 
military mission might have been put.”26 For example, if state A spends $500 million intervening 
in state B for humanitarian reasons, it is sacrificing the opportunity to use that money for, 
perhaps, more self-interested reasons.  Indeed, the United States has used high costs to justify 
non-intervention in humanitarian crises in the past.  During the Rwandan Genocide, for example, 
Washington blocked a Security Council initiative to send reinforcements and expand the 
mandate because of the costs of sending more troops.27  As Valentino points out, the U.S. 
“lacked the will to pay even moderate costs…to prevent the genocide.”28  Costs, among other 
things, was also an inhibiting factor to intervention during the Cambodian Genocide in the 1970s, 
which likely would have cost significantly more than any proposed intervention in Rwanda.29  
Simply put: costs matter.   
Based on the significant role that costs play in decision-making, I predict that the U.S. 
will not intervene in humanitarian crises unless the perceived costs are relatively low.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  25	  Benjamin	  A.	  Valentino,	  “The	  True	  Costs	  of	  Humanitarian	  Intervention:	  The	  Hard	  Truth	  about	  a	  Noble	  Notion,”	  Foreign	  Affairs	  90.6	  (November/December,	  2011)	  66	  26	  Valentino,	  “The	  True	  Costs	  of	  Humanitarian	  Intervention,”	  66	  	  27	  Alan	  J.	  Kuperman,	  “Rwanda	  in	  Retrospect,”	  Foreign	  Affairs	  (2000):	  116	  28	  Benjamin	  Valentino,	  “Still	  Standing	  By:	  Why	  America	  and	  the	  International	  Community	  Fail	  to	  Prevent	  Genocide	  and	  Mass	  Killing,”	  Perspectives	  on	  Politics	  (2003):	  566	  29	  Ibid.,	  574	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Benign Security and Strategic Implications: 
 As explained earlier in the introduction, the anarchic nature of the international system 
inevitably forces states to worry about their security. States fear each other, and because of this 
they strive to maximize their security and become the global hegemon. In the words of John 
Mearsheimer, “great powers are always searching for opportunities to gain power over their 
rivals.”30  This idea is the basis for offensive realism, which posits that power and security are a 
state’s main objectives.   
 The security dilemma that characterized the Cold War perfectly epitomizes realism and 
the importance that states place in maximizing their security.  Apart from the arms race, the 
United States and Soviet Union put great effort into expanding their respective spheres of 
influence and combating the influence of the other.  Sometimes, this resulted in violent proxy 
conflicts such as the Vietnam War.  Other times, it resulted in the U.S. funding or installing 
corrupt and authoritarian, but friendly, regimes for strategic gain (ie. Somalia, Iran).  It is clear 
that the United States goes to extensive effort to maximize its security, and thus the logical 
contrapositive is true too: the United States will not pursue any action that will threaten its 
security.   
 This is evident by the United States’ unwillingness to intervene during the Cambodian 
Genocide.  The nefarious killing campaign by the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia during the 1970s 
was virtually ignored by U.S. policymakers.  As almost 1.5 million Cambodians were killed in 
the genocide, the United States maintained positive relations with Pol Pot’s government because, 
in the words of Henry Kissinger, it was a useful “counterweight” to the North Vietnam 
aggressors. Similar to its relationship with the Barre regime, the U.S. was “prepared to improve 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  30	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  The	  Tragedy	  of	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  Power	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  29	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relations” with the Khmer Rouge even though they were “murderous thugs.”31   However, after 
the Cold War ended, the U.S. led the UNTAC humanitarian operation in Cambodia, even though 
the crisis paled in comparison to what had unfolded two decades earlier. 
 
 Therefore, I predict that the United States will not intervene in humanitarian crises if it 
will threaten its security or strategic interests.  If the U.S. does intervene, it is because the 
security/strategic implications are benign. 
*** 
Chapter 1- Humanitarianism in the Horn: UNITAF and the United States’ Decision to 
Intervene in Somalia 
Introduction: 
 During the Cold War, Somalia was of strategic importance to both the Soviet Union and 
the United States.  Under the leadership of the authoritarian Siad Barre, it aligned with the 
socialist bloc throughout the 1960s and most of the 1970s until the Ogaden War with Ethiopia in 
1977. The Ogaden War was particularly significant because it marked a drastic change in the 
foreign policy of the two great powers in Africa. The Soviet Union stopped supplying aid to 
Somalia and instead began supporting the Derg government in Ethiopia, which it saw as an 
emerging Marxist state of geopolitical importance.  In a truly quintessential display of Cold War 
politics, the United States responded by shifting its allegiance from Ethiopia to Somalia and 
shortly thereafter gained access to Somali military bases.  Michael Johns, a policy analyst for the 
Heritage Foundation, an influential conservative think tank during the Reagan presidency, wrote 
in December of 1989 that “[Somalia] served as a balance to Soviet military involvement in the 
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  Thailand,”	  November	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Horn of Africa and the Arabian Peninsula.”32  Growing popular resistance against the Barre 
regime and reports of human rights violations in the late 1980s greatly concerned U.S. 
policymakers, who feared that a new regime would compromise American access to the region.  
The Heritage Foundation stressed the importance of reviving the military assistance program in 
Somalia, and argued that the Bush administration should open talks with the Somali National 
Movement and other opposition groups “to foster reconciliation” with the government.33  
 The end of the Cold War essentially negated any strategic importance that Somalia had 
had for the United States.  A coalition group of opposition forces eventually overthrew the Barre 
regime in 1991, creating a power vacuum that various clans scrambled to fill.  Somalia became a 
failed anarchic state that fell into an egregiously violent civil war that directly killed between 
30,000 and 50,000 civilians by March 1992.  Yet the Somali population suffered from more than 
just the violence. Inter-clan fighting caused severe devastation of the agricultural sector, 
precipitating a famine that took an additional 200,000 Somali lives by March.34  In January, the 
Red Cross estimated that almost 3 million Somali citizens were suffering from severe nutritional 
needs. Despite the severity of the crisis, the Bush Administration hesitated to become involved in 
what they deemed a conflict resulting from generations of ethnic tensions.  According to Colin 
Powell and other “selective engagers” in the administration, intervention would not be able to 
address the systemic factors that were causing the violence.35  These “selective engagers” 
believed that military force should be used only when there were vital U.S. interests at stake, and   
that the lack of strategic and security concerns in Somalia gave the United States little incentive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  32	  Michael	  Johns,	  “Preserving	  American	  Security	  Ties	  to	  Somalia,”	  The	  Heritage	  Foundation	  Backgrounder	  no.	  745	  (December	  26,	  1989):	  1	  Accessed	  January	  3,	  2014	  http://s3.amazonaws.com/t	  hf_media/1989/pdf/bg	  745.pdf	   	   	  33	  Ibid.,	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  34	  Lisa	  Morje	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  UN	  Peacekeeping	  in	  Civil	  Wars,	  (Cambridge:	  Cambridge	  University	  Press,	  2008),	  27	  35	  Jon	  Western,	  “Sources	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to intervene.  However, by July the Security Council adopted resolution 767 that authorized an 
airlift providing humanitarian assistance to Somali citizens, and by November the U.S. was 
prepared to take a leading role in a military intervention.  What factors caused this reversal in 
policy, and what conditions were present that can explain why the U.S. intervened in the 
humanitarian crisis? 
 Recently, scholarly literature has emerged that downplays the role of the media and “the 
CNN effect” in explaining why the U.S. initially intervened in Somalia.  Warren Strobel is at the 
helm of this argument; his analysis of evening news broadcasts in the months prior to the 
November 25th decision to intervene led him to suggest that media outlets were not particularly 
concerned with the humanitarian crisis in Somalia.  While there was extensive coverage for 
about a month after Bush’s decision to start U.S. airlifts on August 12, Strobel explains that it 
began to decline by mid-September and did not make a revival again until November.36  Jon 
Western echoes this viewpoint as well.37   
 If the media truly did play a smaller role than what has been conventionally understood, 
then why did the Bush Administration intervene? What convinced U.S. decision-makers that the 
conflict was one that should be militarily addressed, and not simply an ethnic struggle to be 
looked upon with pity, but ultimately dismissed?   
 
Section One: Global Civil Society in Somalia: 
NGOs and Jan Wescott’s Situation Reports 
 After the coup that overthrew Siad Barre in January 1991, the United Nations and United 
States government evacuated nearly all personnel that were operating on the ground in Somalia.  
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  “The	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The UN remained more-or-less uninvolved in the conflict until April 1992 when it approved a 
skeleton 550-member force (the UNOSOM I Operation) to monitor a ceasefire and help aid 
agencies deliver food.  However, until this point the International Red Cross and ten international 
NGOs served as “the sole international presence in Somalia.”38 The context that these 
organizations operated within is difficult to imagine.  Armed rival factions loomed at large, not 
to mention bandits that capitalized on the abundance of weaponry, and would often hijack aid 
convoys to either steal food or strengthen the control they had over the population.  NGOs would 
sometimes resort to hiring armed guards to protect them, which were frequently no more than 
“khat-chewing teenagers with machine guns.”39 Two U.S. agencies that were addressing the 
problem, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and the Office of US 
Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), operated from Nairobi because of the danger.  Both of 
these agencies worked closely with NGOs gathering information to send back to Washington.   
 Jan Westcott, the OFDA coordinator, served as the liaison between NGOs and the United 
States.  Throughout 1991 and 1992 she sent a series of cables to Washington called “situation 
reports” that reported the humanitarian conditions on the ground, the programs of the various 
NGOs, and their successes and problems.  Most of the information Westcott sent came from 
NGOs.  Ken Rutherford explains that only a week after OFDA’s evacuation in January, Westcott 
began meeting with the representatives from CARE, Africare, World Concern, and AMREF to 
establish the “Emergency Relief Assistance to Post Civil War Somalia.”  This coalition focused 
on “coordination of resources, sharing of knowledge of existing and planned programs, and 
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promoting donor confidence through effective communication.”40  Through NGOs, Westcott 
hoped to demonstrate the severity of the situation to both the United States and the international 
community and urge them to provide greater assistance.   
 The situation reports that Westcott sent were grim and urgent.  On June 23, 1992 the 
OFDA situation report indicated, “the death rate in Mogadishu is unknown, but NGOs estimate 
that between 100 and 200 people are dying every day in and around the city.”  On October 1, 
OFDA’s report bluntly stated that “security incidents continue to bedevil the relief effort…the 
NGO community has urgently asked the UN to take steps to lessen the danger to relief 
workers.”41 Many other reports echo similar sentiments.  It is clear that from a policy standpoint, 
the principal objectives of NGOs were providing the U.S. government with information on the 
ground and appealing for assistance. 
Abby Stoddard explains that these reports “made a deep impact in Washington for the 
simple reason that they were the only source of ground-level information coming from 
Somalia.”42  Every report that OFDA sent provided the Bush Administration with not only 
information highlighting the severity of the crisis, but also with policy recommendations and 
potential responses, and according to Stoddard, they were the “must read” documents for anyone 
participating in Somalia discussions.  This ground-level information was completely dependent 
on the work of NGOs.  
Information Reaches Washington 
 In Washington throughout 1991 and most of 1992, the general consensus was to remain 
uninvolved in Somalia.  The Bush Administration, including Colin Powell, at the time the 
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Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, argued that the conflict was a result of decades of ethnic 
tension that the United States was incapable of settling.  They believed that intervention should 
only be used when U.S. interests were at stake, and that Somalia fell outside of this distinction.  
Until the late summer of 1992 these “selective engagers,” to borrow a phrase from Jon Western, 
had “asymmetric advantages to information” and were able to frame the issue in a way that made 
intervention seem impractical.43   
 Liberal humanitarianists in Washington and throughout the United States steadily closed 
this information gap as they began accumulating their own facts and advocating for a greater U.S. 
response.  Jan Westcott’s reports to Washington were certainly important in this regard, as they 
reached the desks of Congressmen, the State Department, and even Bush himself.  But NGOs 
and transnational advocacy groups also worked to generate public awareness.  The ICRC and 
CARE, both key organizations operating on the ground in Somalia, started their own grassroots 
campaigns in the U.S. to inform the public and lobby for additional support.  New York Times 
correspondent Jane Perlez traveled to Somalia and became the first reporter to provide a first-
hand account on the famine, drawing considerable attention from the U.S. public and winning a 
Pulitzer Prize in the process. Her trip was facilitated by the International Red Cross.44  Other 
NGOs appealed directly to Bush himself.  In November, a coalition of 160 U.S.-based NGOs 
called InterAction appealed to Bush both publically and privately describing the problems on the 
ground and the obstacles that relief groups were facing.  The group urged the administration to 
ramp up its support for UN relief operations.45  
OFDA also worked with NGOs to gain the attention of the media.  Andrew Natsios, the 
director of OFDA from 1989 to 1991 and afterward Bush’s special emergency coordinator for 	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Somalia, explains that “Even if bureaucracies do not provide early warnings and there is no free 
press, international NGOS frequently provide…the media with information on what is happening 
in the field.”46 According to Natsios, non-governmental organizations “played a particularly 
important-perhaps even decisive- role in generating media coverage…and influencing internal 
policy debates.47 While Warren Strobel effectively debunks the “CNN Effect,” arguing that the 
policy wheels in Washington were already set in motion long before the media began showing 
interest in Somalia, the media still plays in important role in policymaking.  Many organizations 
recognize the media’s capacity to sway domestic opinion, which may in turn pressure the 
government to act quicker than it would have otherwise. Indeed, Andrew Natsios and OFDA 
worked diligently with NGOs to get the media involved as a way to pressure the Bush 
Administration to act.  As Strobel remarks, any impact that the media had was “because the U.S. 
government had pressured itself into acting.”48  
However, perhaps most important in getting the policy ball moving were the visits by 
Senators Nancy Kassebaum and Paul Simon, which not only drew additional attention to 
Somalia, but also made the conflict a higher priority within Congress.   Upon their return, 
Kassebaum and Simon pleaded with other Senators to approve of an armed UN intervention to 
assist aid groups after witnessing the efforts of NGOs.49  Senator Kassebaum specifically cited 
and praised the work of NGOs in a hearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.  
It is important to note that at this point, the proposed intervention did not emphasize 
peacekeeping, but rather simply providing security to aid organizations.  As Kassebaum argued, 	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“the mandate would be simple: to provide protection for relief workers and guard relief 
supplies…”50 This demonstrates that NGOs were important in making Somalia a political 
priority, but also were seen as a mechanism through which a military intervention could work to 
deliver food and relief aid.   
  The efforts of NGOs in bringing the issue to the media, the general public, and liberal 
humanitarianists in Congress succeeded in generating considerable pressure upon the Bush 
Administration to act.  This pressure influenced the administration in a few important ways and 
ultimately convinced Bush that intervention was necessary.  The first way that pressure 
influenced Bush to intervene is best understood by examining the effects of the 1992 election.  
On November 8, Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton defeated President Bush.  Clinton, equipped 
with information coming from organizations on the ground, had been an outspoken advocate for 
military intervention in both the Balkans and in Somalia.  In the first presidential debate on 
October 11, ABC reporter Ann Compton chastised Bush for his inaction in the crises: “Mr. 
President, how can you watch the killing in Bosnia and the ethnic cleansing, or the starvation and 
anarchy in Somalia, and not want to use America’s might…to try to end that kind of suffering.”51  
Bush responded by calling them “very complicated situations,” and repeated the same axiom of 
the selective engagers about “ancient ethnic rivalries” in Yugoslavia that made a military 
solution impossible.  Clinton, in contrast, declared that the U.S. “should try to work with its 
allies to stop it.”  While Clinton stopped short of suggesting military intervention, he explained 
how he had “urged” Bush to support the air-lift, and took an affirmative stance that the U.S. 
“must do what we can.”    
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 Global civil society, and in particular the media, highlighted this divergence between 
Bush and Clinton’s approach to the crisis as a way to increase pressure on the president to act.  
CBS, ABC, and NBC ran a combined 48 news stories between August 2 and August 14 on their 
nightly news programs that challenged Bush and reported the rival views of Clinton.52  Many of 
these stories contrasted Bush’s seemingly apathetic reaction to the atrocities with Clinton’s 
visible abhorrence.  On August 9, ABC World News Tonight “extensively quot[ed] Clinton on 
the need for strong, decisive U.S. leadership.”53 After Clinton was elected as president, and amid 
intense political pressure to intervene, Bush recognized that the White House was about to be 
dominated by liberal humanitarianists that would likely intervene in at least one of the crises.  In 
fact, at the time Bosnia seemed like the likely candidate.  According to Western, Bush conceded 
to pressure to intervene because of the imminent power-swing in the White House.  As Western 
explains, “Given the…intensity of mobilized political pressure to respond to humanitarian 
emergencies, Bush and Powell concluded that if the United States was going to intervene…it 
would be in Somalia and not Bosnia. Somalia was easier.”54  This is explained in more detail in 
chapter two. 
   NGOs and global civil society also succeeded in touching the heart-strings of the 
president. The exceedingly dismal ground reports began to take an emotional toll on Bush.  
Citing the personal accounts of National Security Advisor Brent Scowcroft, Western explains 
that “[Bush] was personally affected by the reports and by the pressure he was receiving on 
Somalia by groups…[he] began asking his advisors whether anything could be done...”55 This 
sentiment is reflected in a statement Bush made during the first presidential debate: “I am very 
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concerned about [Bosnia].  I am concerned about ethnic cleansing.  I am concerned about a tax 
on Muslims.”56  The evidence also suggests that Bush was motivated by past experiences.  
According to Andrew Natsios, President Bush drew a parallel between the Somalia crisis and the 
1985 Sudan famine, which he had visited while serving as Vice President.57  Natsios insists this 
memory influenced his decision to intervene, as well as other genuinely altruistic concerns.  
Further, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for African Affairs James L. Woods remembers, 
“it was truly his [Bush’s] personal decision, based in large measure on his growing feelings of 
concern as the humanitarian disaster continued to unfold…”58 Although Bush certainly did not 
make a visceral decision to intervene, the information he received from NGO reports clearly 
influenced him on an emotional level and motivated his decision.  
 Another way that civil society pressure influenced Bush’s decision was by threatening his 
legacy.  Despite Bush’s successful foreign policy record, in particular his impressive coalition 
building and management of the Gulf War, his track record on humanitarian crises was not 
something Americans viewed positively.  Shortly after Bush announced the U.S. would lead the 
operation, a joint poll by the New York Times and CBS revealed that 81% of participants 
believed sending American troops into Somalia was the right thing to do.  70% even agreed that 
the mission justified the loss of American lives.59  With the American public clearly on the side 
of the liberal humanitarianists, Bush believed, according to Brent Scowcroft, that intervention in 
Somalia would be a positive contribution to his legacy.60 
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In July, Bush agreed to an airlift that would deliver relief to suffering Somalis, and on the 
26th the Security Council passed Resolution 767 to authorize it. On the 25th, the President finally 
submitted to months of political pressure and called for the deployment of U.S. forces through a 
U.N. sanctioned military intervention.  The mandate of the UNITAF operation, dubbed 
Operation Restore Hope, was to create a safe environment for the delivery of aid.61  For the 
United States, this was an unprecedented policy decision that deviated significantly from the 
ideology of the selective engagers.  Without the information and pressure from NGOs and global 
civil society at large, it is unlikely that U.S. military involvement would have ever occurred.  In 
fact, the first situation report following U.S. deployment explicitly stated that Operation Restore 
Hope was “in response to sentiment expressed” by the U.N., U.S. government representatives, 
and non-governmental organizations.62   
The Interventions: An NGO-Oriented Perspective 
When the UN first got involved in mid-1992 with UNOSOM I, its services were often 
ineffective and paled in comparison to the efforts of NGOs.  Westcott explains that the UN 
Development Programme initially viewed the work of aid groups as inferior and tried to distance 
itself from them until “they realized…NGOs were way ahead of them in terms of knowing what 
the situation was in Somalia and planning relief interventions.”63 The NGOs that had been 
operating on the ground were already experienced in distributing food (delivering and 
transporting approximately 21,000 megatons of food from January to October, 1991), reporting 
hostilities and looting, and establishing rehabilitation programs in hospitals.  They understood 	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the particular factors that were contributing to the fighting and hindering the humanitarian 
response to a far greater degree than the UN did.    
The UNITAF operation’s original mandate was NGO-centric.  It was established to 
protect aid organizations and help their convoys deliver relief, further demonstrating global civil 
society’s influence on U.S. policy.  In terms of protecting aid convoys, Operation Restore hope is 
generally viewed as a success.  However, the lack of a strategy regarding interclan warfare and 
peacekeeping stripped the intervention of its ability to address the systemic factors of the conflict.  
Some argued that, for example, if military forces had worked to disarm militia groups or raid 
weapons caches, perhaps the violence in Somalia would have declined.  Yet American forces 
often worked with the warlords who were in control of the humanitarian aid routes, urging them 
to cooperate with food delivery and therefore giving them some sense of political legitimacy.64  
Because of this, UNITAF was unable to end the civil war and completely alleviate the suffering. 
Conclusion 
Non-governmental organizations were important actors in convincing the Bush 
Administration to intervene.  NGOs worked with Jan Westcott and OFDA to generate reports 
illustrating the worsening humanitarian crisis on the ground, and this information was extremely 
important in mobilizing liberal humanitarianists in the public and in the government.  
Additionally, NGOs were the catalyst for the political pressure against the administration to act, 
and they worked with the media to escalate this pressure as the crisis worsened. Without the 
strong global civil society network, it is unlikely that Somalia would have ever been an important 
item on Bush’s agenda, not to mention a target of intervention.  
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Section Two: Low Costs in Somalia 
 While the Bush Administration was contemplating action in Somalia throughout 1992, 
another issue was beginning to flare up in the Balkans.  In March 1992, Muslims and Croats in 
Bosnia voted for independence from Yugoslavia in a referendum that was boycotted by the Serbs.  
In April, the European Union officially recognized Bosnia and Herzegovina as a sovereign entity, 
and a month later the United Nations followed suit by accepting it as a member state.  Tensions 
between the Bosniaks and Croats, who favored independence, and the Serbs, who preferred 
remaining with Yugoslavia, heightened and eventually culminated in full-fledged civil war.  
Serbian President Slobodan Milošević and the Serbs set out to establish a Serb Republic in the 
region, and through a sweeping campaign of violence occupied around 70% of the country by 
April.65  Serb forces employed methods reminiscent of the Rape of Nanking or the Cambodian 
Genocide by the Khmer Rouge in the 1970s: they looted and burned Bosniak villages and beat, 
raped, and killed innocent civilians.  Over two million people were refugees by the end of the 
war.  The Bosnian government lost any authoritative capability it had once had, and in May the 
United Nations increased its involvement by imposing sanctions on Serbia.  Just as there was 
mounting pressure on the Bush Administration to intervene in Somalia, voices began to call for a 
U.S. presence in the Balkans as well.  Faced with two horrific humanitarian crises and 
tremendous pressure to act, the Bush Administration realized it had to do something.  This 
chapter will demonstrate how the low relative material and personnel costs of UNITAF played a 
decisive factor in the Bush Administration ultimately intervening in Somalia instead of Bosnia.  
Intervention was possible because the Somalia operation was seen as relatively cheap compared 
to the alternative.  Otherwise, the Somalia intervention may never have happened.   
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Bosnia: Another Vietnam  
As domestic pressure for a Bosnia intervention grew, selective engagers in the Bush 
Administration increased their efforts to frame the crisis as a result of centuries of ethnic feuds.  
It was very much the same approach that was taken when explaining inter-clan warfare in 
Somalia.  In an attempt to divert American interest away from intervention, Secretary of State 
Lawrence Eagleburger argued in 1992, "this war is not rational.  There is no rationality at all 
about ethnic conflict.  It is gut; it is hatred; it's not for any common set of values or purposes; it 
just goes on.”66 Acting on the public distaste for American involvement in Southeast Asia less 
than two decades earlier, Eagleburger compared the conflict to Vietnam.  He argued that even a 
limited intervention in Bosnia would have calamitous consequences, as the ‘do a little bit’ 
approach often slowly evolves into more invested involvement and a protracted conflict, as 
evidenced in Vietnam.  Indeed, American military strategy during the Bush Administration was 
based upon what is now known as the Powell Doctrine.  Named after General Colin Powell, the 
doctrine argues that any war involving the United States should be fought with overwhelming 
force against the enemy to minimize American casualties and ensure a decisive victory.  The 
strategy had been largely successful in the 1991 Gulf War, and by nature opposed the limited 
approaches to conflicts that were being advocated for the Bosnian War.  To Powell, suggestions 
of a limited approach completely disregarded the reality of the conflict: "as soon as they tell me 
it is limited, it means they do not care whether you achieve a result or not.  As soon as they tell 
me it's 'surgical,' I head for the bunker.”67 The Bush Administration simply did not want to be 
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drawn into another Vietnam-like quagmire in which there was no clear solution, and especially 
not in a conflict that had no clear U.S. interests at stake.     
Yet even a limited intervention would be unbearably costly for the United States.  The 
Joint Chiefs of Staff predicted in June of 1992 that an emergency humanitarian airlift, far 
cheaper than a full-scale military intervention to stop the conflict, would itself require over 
50,000 American troops to secure a perimeter around the Sarajevo Airport.  The predictions for a 
military intervention were even more exceptional.  In August, the Joint Chiefs of Staff told 
Congress that between 60,000 and 120,000 troops would be needed to break the siege of 
Sarajevo by the Army of Republika Srpska (the armed forces of what was then known as the 
Serbian Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina), and a whopping 400,000 would be needed for a 
full cease-fire.68 President Bush believed that the European Union should bear these costs rather 
than the United States, and that the problem in the Balkans was fundamentally a European issue 
and not an American one.69 
Pressure for U.S. Action Mounts  
The efforts of the selective engagers in the Bush Administration to frame the Bosnia 
conflict as unsolvable did not stop the flux of demands for intervention. Again, the Bosnia 
narrative unfolded in a similar manner as Somalia's.  The New York Times and Washington Post 
published articles advocating for intervention and condemning the Bush Administration for its 
response, arguing that American taxpayers should expect "more for their money than no-can-
do.”70 NGOs worked closely with members of the Senate Intelligence Committee to determine 
whether Milošević’s armed forces were committing genocide, and appealed to the administration 
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to act.71  Eventually, the aggregate pressure for intervention in Somalia and Bosnia, as well as 
President Bush's genuine humanitarian concerns, influenced a change in U.S. policy.  The Bush 
Administration realized that its inaction was politically and morally costly and that some type of 
action was necessary, and ultimately decided to intervene in Somalia instead of Bosnia.  As 
Secretary Eagleburger explains, intervening in Somalia was “a way for the administration to take 
some of the pressure off not doing anything in Bosnia.”72 Yet why did Bush agree to a Somalia 
operation and not Bosnia, when the two humanitarian crises were similarly destructive?  
Somalia: A Relatively Low-Cost Operation  
Somalia presented itself to the Bush Administration as a relatively low cost operation that 
could divert public attention away from the Bosnia crisis.  Though the intervention certainly 
entailed costs, the personnel commitments paled in comparison to what a Bosnia operation 
would have entailed.  At the height of UNITAF, the United States had approximately 25,000-
30,000 boots on the ground to lead the operation, half of what the Joint Chiefs of Staff predicted 
for an airlift in Bosnia and about one-fourth of what was deemed necessary to break the siege of 
Sarajevo.73 UNITAF's mandate was also limited in scope, especially in comparison to what 
military planners were discussing for Bosnia.  President Bush described the operation's objective 
to Congress and the public as simply "insur[ing] the safe delivery of food Somalis need to 
survive."74 Lawrence Eagleburger was more blunt but indicated the same sentiment, saying the 
intention was to "feed and get out.”75  The mandate did not mention disarmament of clan militias 
and noticeably avoided any obligation to end the violence and provide stability.  Indeed, Colin 
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Powell even withheld his support for the operation until it was certain that the U.S. would be 
responsible only for securing the delivery of humanitarian aid and not for peacekeeping.76 
The relative low costs of the operation thus made Somalia a much more attractive option 
than Bosnia.  After finally committing to the operation, the Bush Administration repeatedly 
justified their decision by using this rationale. Eagleburger, who had earlier called the war in 
Bosnia "not rational" and unmanageable for the U.S. military, argued that Somalia was an area 
where "we can, in fact, affect events."  He continued by insisting, "there are other parts of the 
world where things are equally tragic, but where the costs of trying to change things would be 
monumental- in my view, Bosnia is one of those.”77  Bush's National Security Advisor Brent 
Scowcroft also highlighted the importance of UNITAF's relative low military costs as a reason 
for the policy change.  He explained that "we thought that the military costs would be low, and 
the chances of something going wrong were almost non-existent.  The net was clearly a plus.”78  
It is evident that Scowcroft and Eagleburger, as well as other Bush Administration officials, were 
willing to bear the costs of the Somalia but not Bosnia. Pushed into a corner in which the only 
escape was taking some form of action, decision-makers reasoned that the benefits of taking 
action in Somalia outweighed the material costs of the operation, something that could not be 
said for a Bosnia intervention. 
 Senior military officials, arguably the most resistant to intervention throughout 1992, 
reluctantly acceded to the pressure by the end of the year and assured Bush that they could get 
the job done. Again, their planning was based the low costs of Somalia compared to Bosnia.  On 
November 20th at a National Security Council meeting, the Deputies Committee discussed three 	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possible avenues for dealing with Somalia: increasing financial support for the current UN 
peacekeeping force, establishing a broader UN effort for which the US would provide strictly 
logistical support, or leading a multi-national intervention.  Initially, the intervention option was 
discarded.  Yet the next day Admiral David Jeremiah changed his stance and told the deputies 
meeting that the military was available to lead an operation in Somalia.  While he recognized 
that deploying a force of around 30,000 would certainly be costly, he explained that "Bosnia 
made it seem as if we could do Somalia with a relatively moderate force… thirty thousand 
wouldn't get you a running start in Bosnia.”79  From Jeremiah and the Joint Chiefs of Staff's 
perspective, if there was no way around intervention, Somalia was by far the more sensible 
operation. 
Conclusion 
 After months of tremendous pressure from non-governmental organizations, the public, 
and government liberal humanitarianists, the Bush Administration reversed their non-
intervention policy.  However, the decision to intervene specifically in Somalia and not Bosnia 
was rooted in costs.  Although the situation in Bosnia in 1992 was certainly dire, the Bush 
Administration and senior military planners concluded that intervention in the Balkans would be 
not only extremely expensive, but also risky.  Somalia, in contrast, was seen as a relatively low-
cost operation with a higher chance of success.  It was thus a more attractive option to 
policymakers, who saw intervention as a way to pacify advocates who were arguing for 
American action in both areas.   
Section Three: Benign Security/Strategic Implications in Somalia: 
The paramount priority of American military planning during the Cold War years was 
countering Soviet power. Korea, Southeast Asia (ie. Cambodia, Vietnam), Latin America (ie. 	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Nicaragua, Guatemala, Cuba, El Salvador), the Middle East (ie. Iran, Afghanistan), Western 
Europe (ie. Greece), and Eastern Europe (ie. Hungary) all became areas of strategic importance 
where the United States and Soviet Union sought to extend their influence.  The Horn of Africa 
was no exception.  From the late 1970s throughout the following decade, Somalia served as an 
important regional counterweight to Soviet influence in Ethiopia.  Yet as tensions eased with the 
fall of the Berlin Wall, the strategic significance of Somalia dissipated almost instantly.  This 
chapter will explain Somalia’s strategic significance, or lack thereof, during the humanitarian 
crisis that plagued the nation in the early 1990s.  It will demonstrate that while humanitarian 
intervention would have been out of the question for the United States during the 1980s, a period 
when the Siad Barre regime’s human rights abuses first came to light, the lack of security and 
strategic implications after the Cold War made intervention strategically uncostly and a viable 
course of action.     
The Strategic Importance of Somalia during the Cold War 
 Located by the Red Sea shipping lanes and the Bab-el-Mandeb straits, Somalia was of 
substantial interest to the United States during the Cold War years.  This stemmed from the fact 
that Somalia’s geography is particularly conducive for shipping oil.  The Petroleum Economist 
estimated in October 1989 that a whopping 500,000 barrels of crude oil passed through the Gulf 
of Aden daily, with a significant volume reaching Europe, North America, and American allies 
in Asia.80 Additionally, the Bab-el-Mandeb straits, referred to as the “chokepoint” of the Horn of 
Africa, serves as the principle channel of oil shipments between the Persian Gulf and Western 
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Europe.81  During the 1970s, and especially after the OPEC oil embargo, the United States began 
taking steps to ensure that it had clout in the strategically important region.   
 Another matter of concern for the United States was the deep Soviet military involvement 
in neighboring Ethiopia.  Although the U.S.S.R. had established friendly diplomatic relations 
with the Barre regime throughout the 1970s, signing a treaty of friendship and cooperation with 
Somalia in 1974 (validated by over $400 million in military support), the Soviets abruptly 
changed course in 1977.  Recognizing Ethiopia as “the greater strategic prize,” the Soviet Union 
withdrew its support for Barre at the start of the Ogaden War and offered military assistance to 
the state’s new leader, Mengistu Haile Mariam.82  Michael Johns of the Heritage Foundation 
suggests that this reversal of policy was a well-calculated move by the Soviet Union that was 
driven by strategic considerations.  The U.S.S.R. was taking advantage of the strained relations 
between the United States and Mariam, fueled by accusations of the Ethiopian leader’s human 
rights violations, while at the same time recognizing that it simply had more to gain by aligning 
with Ethiopia.  Having a military presence in Ethiopia meant that the Soviet Union could obtain 
access to Red Sea ports a mere 200 miles away from Saudi Arabia.  It also bolstered the 
U.S.S.R.’s regional power in relation to the United States.   
 As the Cold War paradigm suggests, for every strategic action taken by one superpower 
there was an equal and opposite reaction by the other.  After the Soviet Union signed a friendship 
agreement with Ethiopia in November 1978, and invested over 1 billion dollars in weapons 
assistance over the course of the following year, Barre terminated his agreement with Moscow 
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and looked to the Western bloc for assistance.83  However, the United States was initially 
reluctant to support Somalia.  The Barre regime had claimed ownership of the Ogaden region 
and supported the insurgency, a move that neither the United States nor the other African 
countries had looked at favorably.  Additionally, negative sentiment in America regarding the 
Vietnam War made military planners hesitant to align with another warring state.84  Yet 
Ethiopia’s evident success in the Ogaden Conflict ultimately convinced the United States that 
countering Soviet influence in the region was a necessity, and by the end of the decade 
Washington began providing Mogadishu with developmental and military assistance.  In 1978, 
the U.S. opened an Agency for International Development office in Somalia and established a 
series of development initiatives including livestock programs, management training programs, 
and health services.85  Between 1979 and 1989, USAID contributions totaled over $620 million 
and “targeted sectoral growth and stabilizing the economy in the short run, while intending to 
address larger macroeconomic problems later in the program.”86  In terms of military aid, the U.S. 
granted Somalia an additional $133.5 million between 1980 and 1989, as well as military 
training and weapons.87  In sum, Somalia received more than $800 million of economic and 
military aid from the United States between 1971 and 1991.88 
 In return, Somalia granted the United States access to various key bases and ports in the 
country.  An agreement in 1980 allowed the U.S. to use airfields and dock facilities at the port of 
Berbera (ironically built by the Soviet Union) in the north of Somalia, the port of Kismayu in the 
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south, and in Mogadishu.  The location of the airstrips at Berbera and Mogadishu were well 
suited for combat air operations in the Persian Gulf, the Red Sea, or in the Indian Ocean.  
Additionally, the agreement permitted the U.S. to conduct joint exercises with Somali forces, 
dock and refuel ships, and conduct military repairs at the facilities.89 These concessions were 
important to counter Soviet influence in the region. 
Wanting to “Stay Engaged” With a Dictator 
 The era of amity between the United States and Somalia, however important to American 
strategic interests, was tainted by an inauspicious development in the mid 1980s: the Siad Barre 
regime was committing human rights abuses against Somali citizens.  As Barre began to lose his 
grip over Somali affairs, especially in the countryside where rival clans were fighting each other, 
the regime turned to political imprisonment, torture, and political killings (especially against the 
Isaaks clan) as a means to consolidate power.90  First and foremost, Barre was concerned with 
making sure his family and clan, the Marehans, remained in power as his health began to 
deteriorate by the late 1980s.  A series of government-backed killing campaigns highlighted the 
discontent in Somalia with the regime and the paranoia of Barre as he witnessed his political 
power weakening.  For example, in May 1988 the regime bombed Somali citizens after a 
demonstration against Barre’s rule.  On July 16, 1989 during Eid al-Adha, an important Muslim 
holiday, the government arrested six eminent imams and opened fire on the crowd of 
worshippers, killing over 1,000 innocent civilians.91  The Human Rights Watch, in conjunction 
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with Africa Watch, reported in 1990 that between 50,000 and 60,000 people were killed by 
government forces, either by shooting, aerial bombardment, or artillery shelling.92 
 The U.S. condemnation of these human rights abuses was at best superficial. While the 
United States ended its lethal military aid for Somalia in 1988, and redirected $21 million in 
economic assistance to other African countries, members of the Reagan and Bush 
Administrations voiced the importance of upholding positive relations with Somalia.  In October 
1988, a State Department Spokesman commented in regards to relations with Somalia, “we don’t 
want to give a sign of withdrawal…we want to stay engaged.”93  Additionally, in a letter to the 
New York Times in 1989, Assistant Secretary of State for Human Rights and Humanitarian 
Affairs Richard Schifter defended sending additional economic aid to Somalia.  In a more 
symbolic display of the Bush Administration wanting to stay engaged, on June 20, 1989 the 
administration neglected to send a witness to a House Banking Subcommittee on International 
Development Institutions and Finance hearing that was examining U.S. human rights policy in 
the context of aid to Somalia.  This demonstrated the administration’s unwillingness to denounce 
the Somali government.  While the Bush Administration did make efforts to investigate atrocities 
in Somalia, and did reevaluate their Somalia policy, as the Human Rights Watch declared in late 
1989, “the potential impact of the Bush Administration’s decision to investigate…was all but 
nullified by the administration’s efforts to persuade Congress to provide military and economic 
assistance to the very forces responsible for those abuses.94  To the Bush Administration, staying 
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engaged was essential during the Cold War, and the implications of condemning the human 
rights abuses were too great to bear.   
A Complete 180: U.S. Policy after the Cold War 
 With the end of the Cold War, American strategic interest in Somalia virtually dissipated.  
As Jon Western explains, the Bush Administration was initially uninterested in the humanitarian 
crisis because it was “not relevant to U.S. vital interests” and was instead just “[a] humanitarian 
traged[y].”95  Matthew A. Baum agrees, arguing, “the strategic stakes for the United States in 
Somalia were arguably as small as they have ever been in a U.S. deployment overseas.”96  There 
is little evidence that suggests the United States had any ulterior motives other than the 
promotion of moral goals.   
 Notwithstanding the evidence, arguments suggesting that the United States intervened for 
self-interested reasons do exist.  David N. Gibbs from the University of Arizona, for example, 
contends that the intervention was partly a manifestation of American realpolitik, and suggests 
that gaining access to oil supplies in Somalia was a consideration during the decision-making 
process.97  His argument rests on the fact that Conoco, an American oil company, had 
connections with both U.S. government officials as well as Mohammed Farah Aideed, a former 
member of the United Somali Congress that helped overthrow the Barre regime and who later 
led the Somali National Alliance.  However, this evidence is at best questionable.  As Valerie J. 
Lofland explains, after the Cold War, and especially after the Gulf War, Middle Eastern oil fields 
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were already accessible to the United States through the Gulf Cooperative Council nations.98  
The impetus for intervention was thus not an American desire to exploit Somali oil fields. 
 Others may argue that the strategic aspect of intervention was protecting the U.S. image 
as the leader of the post-Cold War New World Order.  Indeed, President Bush had made 
Smerican leadership point of a speech before Congress in September, 1990 when he declared, 
“there is no substitute for U.S. leadership…let no one doubt American credibility and 
reliability…Americans have stepped forward…in defense of principal and the dream of a new 
world order.”99  However, the evidence suggests that American image was not overly influential 
in Bush’s decision to intervene.  Baumann et al. explain that both Bush and the Pentagon 
recognized the assertion of the United States as the backbone of a “New World Order” as more 
of a political statement than a boundless commitment, and that intervention in Somalia was more 
rooted in moral considerations and the opportunity to deflect pressure to intervene in Bosnia.100  
Nicholas Wheeler agrees, arguing that there were no hidden power-political reasons motivating 
intervention.101  
Rather, there was little material gain to be made by the United States by intervening.  On 
the other side of the coin, there was little to be lost by the U.S. by intervening as well, as long as 
the intervention remained limited.  The negative strategic implications that would have been 
suffered had the U.S. intervened to stop Barre’s human rights abuses during the Cold War, or 
even if they had disengaged from the government for that matter, did not exist after the fall of the 
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Berlin Wall.  Michael Desch and Nicholas J. Wheeler echo this point from a realist perspective, 
explaining that states will not intervene in humanitarian crises if the intervention is perceived to 
undermine a state’s security or economic interests.102  Wheeler writes, “Bush would have ruled 
out Operation Restore Hope had he believed that this threatened U.S. security interests.” 
Somalia’s geo-strategic importance in terms of access to oil and countering Soviet regional 
influence was no longer true, and thus the strategic costs of intervening no longer existed either.  
Intervention was therefore possible. 
Conclusion: 
 After the Cold War ended, the United States had greater flexibility to intervene in areas 
that would have been strategically impossible beforehand.  While intervening in Somalia, or 
even disengaging, would have had severe strategic and security implications during the Cold 
War, these costs disappeared as Cold War tensions abated.  This made intervention possible. 
 When the strategic and security implications of humanitarian intervention are too high, 
intervention will not occur.  Conversely, when the implications are benign and my other 
conditions hold true, intervention will occur.  In the next part of this project, I will demonstrate 
how the United States refrained from intervening in the Darfur Crisis because these conditions 
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Chapter Two- The Limits of the Humanitarian Norm in the Darfur Genocide 
Although many current accounts of the Darfur Crisis cite 2003 as the beginning of the 
war, widespread violence has plagued the region since the 1990s.103  In June 1997, Darfuri 
members of parliament unsuccessfully demanded self-determination for the region, motivated in 
part by the oil-rich land.  Khartoum denied these requests with force, and by March 1998 around 
100 Darfuris had been killed at the hands of the state.104   
 In 2003, the Sudan Liberation Army (SLA) and the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM) 
initiated a rebellion that was again met with violent opposition.  The Omar al-Bashir regime 
launched a terror campaign using scorched earth tactics and air raids against civilians, forcing 
those who were lucky enough to escape death to migrate elsewhere, particularly into neighboring 
Chad.  Perhaps the biggest threat to civilians was the government-sponsored janjaweed, Arab 
militia on horseback that would rape and pillage Darfuri villages.  Although technically a civil 
war, the conflict has been referred to some, most notably the United States, as genocide because 
of the discriminate and systematic nature of the killing.  The UN estimated that as of 2008, up to 
300,000 people had died and another 2.5 million had been displaced in Darfur.105  
 There are differing interpretations as to why the conflict erupted.  Some believe that 
contending racial or religious attitudes can explain the violence, framing the conflict as “Arabs 
committing genocide against an African population.”106  However, Randall Fegley notes that the 
SLA and JEM have been linked to militant Islamist groups, suggesting that racism is not the 
underlying factor.  The Save Darfur Coalition echoes this point, explaining on its website that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  103	  Douglas	  Johnson,	  The	  Root	  Causes	  of	  Sudan’s	  Civil	  Wars:	  Peace	  or	  Truce	  (Kampala:	  Fountain	  Publishers,	  2011):	  xviii	  104	  Randall	  Fegley,	  Beyond	  Khartoum:	  A	  History	  of	  Subnational	  Government	  in	  Sudan,	  (Trenton:	  The	  Red	  Sea	  Press,	  Inc,	  2011):	  235	  105	  Johnson,	  The	  Root	  Causes	  of	  Sudan’s	  Civil	  Wars,	  178	  106	  Mahmood	  Mamdani,	  Survivors	  and	  Saviors:	  Darfur,	  Politics,	  and	  the	  War	  on	  Terror,	  (New	  York:	  Pantheon	  Books,	  2009),	  51-­‐52	  
Purinton	  43	  	  
this is a common myth that should be dispelled.107  A seemingly more accurate explanation 
offered by Fegley is that the rebellion is a response to the “brutal rule and interference” of 
Khartoum over Darfuri affairs for decades.108  Indeed, Khamis Ahmad Osman, a rebel who 
joined the SLA after 21 years in the government army, listed “freedom” and “justice” as his two 
motivations for joining.109  Regardless of the reasons for the instability in Darfur, the existence 
of a humanitarian disaster cannot be denied.  Yet even after calling it genocide, the United States 
never led a unilateral humanitarian intervention in the region as it did in Iraq, never took a 
leadership role through NATO, and did not deploy troops on the ground to support the UN 
operation.  Why did the U.S. avoid intervention? As civil society, costs, and security 
implications were important factors that led to intervention in Somalia, they are also fundamental 
factors as to why there was no intervention in Darfur.    
 
Section One: Global Civil Society in Darfur 
The Conflict’s Early Years: NGOs Break Through Khartoum’s Information Blackout in 2003-04 
 As humanitarian conditions continued to worsen in Darfur, Omar al-Bashir’s government 
made a concerted effort to suppress the release of any information painting a grim picture of 
reality.  Khartoum denied visas to visiting journalists, human rights investigators, and aid NGOs, 
local news correspondents were arrested after reporting government attacks, and Sudanese 
human rights activists were regularly arrested without access to a fair trial.  Alex de Waal, who 
served on the African Union mediation team for Darfur in 2005-2006, explains that 
“international NGOs found themselves facing a bleak choice: to turn a blind eye to atrocities, or 
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to speak out and risk being expelled.”110  Khartoum’s secrecy was essential not only for winning 
the war in Darfur without eliciting outside interference, but also for establishing complete 
domination over the region and extending Arab unity into Chad.  This is reflected in an Arab 
Gathering report in 2003 that explicitly called for “totally control[ing] power in the state” 
through “secrecy of important information for security of the procession.”111 An immediate 
response to the conflict was thus hampered by an information blackout, and many early reports 
of the humanitarian crisis had to rely on inaccurate third-hand accounts from people in other 
countries.112 
 While Bashir’s information monopoly was successful within Sudan’s borders, the media 
and NGOs were able to escape his iron grip by reporting from neighboring Chad.  Since many 
Darfuris were forced into Chad by the violence and terror campaigns of the Janjaweed, the 
conflict became more than simply a Sudanese problem.  This had two important implications.  
Firstly, the internationalization of the conflict made it one that was a threat to “international 
peace,” echoing the words of the U.N.’s Chapter VII that identifies this condition as one that 
warrants outside intervention.  The crisis thus became of interest to the international community, 
and to both state and non-state actors.  Secondly, it allowed reporters and human rights activists 
to interview refugees and investigate in a manner that was impossible in Darfur.  One June 23, 
2004, Lorne Craner, assistant secretary for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor at the State 
Department, brought together a group of NGOs to prepare a report on the conditions of Darfur 
and the reality of the violence.113  With financial assistance from USAID, these NGOs 	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interviewed 1,147 refugees along the Sudan-Chad border and reported their results to Colin 
Powell and the State Department.  The findings of the study were revealing enough that Powell 
made the provocative decision to label the crisis genocide, arguing that “the conclusion on 
genocide was legally supportable.”114  Identifying the conflict in Darfur as genocide had legally-
binding implications through the 1948 Genocide Convention, and non-legal obligations through 
the UN Declaration of Human Rights and the Responsibility to Protect Initiative (although in 
2004, R2P was still just a theory and not a stated initiative).  NGOs thus played a decisive role in 
changing the nature of the conflict, and shaping the way that the U.S. and other states would 
subsequently respond to it.   
The Successes of the Darfur Advocacy Movement in Shaping U.S. Policy: 
 The labeling of Darfur as genocide by the world’s strongest state, and by a state that had 
historically shied away from such a word in fear of its implications, drew considerable attention 
from human rights organizations.  It also opened the door for an unprecedented citizen-driven 
advocacy movement that, as David Rieff first coined, lobbied people “in churches and shopping 
malls” rather than just those with power.115  Citizen interest spread across many different social 
circles, from college students to religious associations.  Lisa Rogoff, a student intern at the U.S. 
Holocaust Memorial Museum, prepared a poignant presentation about Darfur for fellow students 
just days after Powell’s statements.  Her presentation convinced members in the audience to act, 
and soon after the first chapter of STAND (Students Take Action Now for Darfur) was 
established.  Beginning at Georgetown, the group eventually spread to over 750 chapters at 
universities throughout the United States, striving to “actively fight genocide” on the premise 
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that “students are the agents of change.”116  Swarthmore students Sam Bell and Mark Hanis 
worked with STAND to fundraise money to directly fund the African Union’s mission in Sudan 
(AMIS), eventually branching off to develop their own group- the Genocide Intervention 
Network.117   
 Perhaps the most well-known Darfur advocacy network was the Save Darfur Coalition, 
established by David Rubenstein in 2004.  While also a money-raising campaign, the Save 
Darfur Coalition saw itself as a potential catalyst to generate American interest and persuade 
those with power in the government to act, breaking away from the “society-wide silence as an 
indicator of public indifference” that had allowed U.S. policymakers to ignore genocide in the 
past. 118 The emerging R2P norm was a fundamental principle of the coalition’s ideology.119 
Rubenstein and other leaders of the movement argued that Westphalian sovereignty was a 
privilege, not a right, and that a state’s refusal to protect its citizens necessarily warranted 
intervention by the international community.  Save Darfur thus strove to hold states to their 
previously-stated commitments to ending genocide, and saw domestic politics as an avenue to 
achieve this goal.  
 In her comprehensive analysis of the Darfur movement, Fighting for Darfur, journalist 
Rebecca Hamilton highlights the successes of civil society in influencing American policy in 
Darfur.  She writes, “the mobilization of thousands of citizens as first-time advocates was one of 
the movement’s greatest strengths,” as Congressmen were surprisingly responsive to their 
constituents’ requests.120 Sam Bell’s Genocide Intervention Network created a telephone number 
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that, when called, informed citizens of Darfur legislation that was on the floor in Congress and 
subsequently connected them with their representatives.  The group also graded Congressmen on 
their response to Darfur on an A+-F scale, a score that was taken seriously enough that many 
representatives published their results on their websites and press releases for their constituents 
to see.  Hamilton notes that out of the 167 representatives who received an F in August 2006, all 
but one took action to improve their grade over the following 18 months.121  
 Civil society was also successful in persuading the President to act.  Save Darfur led a 
call for Bush to appoint a special envoy to Sudan by placing ads in prominent newspapers, and 
citizens urged Congressmen to pressure the executive branch to act.  On July 5, 2006, citizens 
succeeded as a bi-partisan group of Congressmen Mike Capuano of Massachusetts, Donald 
Payne of New Jersey, Tom Tancredo of Colorado, and Frank Wolf of Virginia wrote a letter to 
President Bush “expressing deep concern over the worsening humanitarian situation in Darfur 
and calling on him to immediately appoint a Special Envoy to Sudan.”122  Two months later, 
Bush succumbed to the pressure, appointing Andrew Natsios to fill the role in September.123 
Bush Jr. also felt upset at articles condemning his Darfur policy.  Michael Gerson, working in the 
chief-of-staff’s office during the second Bush Administration, explains that a February 2006 
article by Nicholas Kristof was especially troubling to the President and convinced him to look 
into additional possibilities for action.124 Civil society organizations were thus key actors in 
generating U.S. interest in the conflict and persuading the state to act.   
Civil Society and Darfur: Why was there no Intervention? 
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If the civil society movement and efforts by NGOs were so successful in influencing 
policymakers, then why did the United States never lead an intervention in Darfur?  One reason 
why the civil society movement did not lead to a U.S. intervention is because there was simply 
very little pressure to deploy American boots on the ground.  Instead, the Save Darfur movement 
pressured the U.S. to act by funding the already operational African Union mission.  In April 
2005, Sam Bell and the Genocide Prevention Network planned a “100 Days of Action” 
campaign with a goal of fundraising $1 million for AMIS.  The group hoped that be generating 
enough money and public interest, they could shame Washington to boost its own contributions.  
The Save Darfur Coalition launched a similar event called the “Day of Action for Darfur” in 
September 2005.  Rubenstein’s group created a Powerpoint presentation for citizens highlighting 
the need for greater UN, EU, and NATO monetary contributions for AMIS to protect civilians.  
While these advocacy groups pressured the U.S. to act by providing money, pressure to act 
through a military intervention was largely absent from the Darfur discourse.  Hamilton notes 
that, perhaps surprisingly, “no member of the Save Darfur Coalition actually called for the 
deployment of U.S. troops.”125  Indeed, David Rubenstein even mentioned his reluctance for an 
intervention, wondering how the military would even proceed once they got there.126 
Professional aid organizations were also opposed to intervention.  Action Against Hunger, 
a group working on the ground to deliver humanitarian aid in Darfur, cautioned against 
intervention without approval from Khartoum: “[intervention] could have disastrous 
consequences that risk triggering a further escalation of violence while jeopardizing the 
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provision of vital humanitarian assistance to millions of people.”127  After the Save Darfur 
Coalition placed newspaper ads urging the Bush Administration to approve a no-fly zone, the 
closest thing to a military intervention that the group called for, active aid organizations came out 
in vehement opposition.  Some argued that disallowing flights would inhibit the ability of 
organizations to deliver aid, thus doing more harm than good.  Sam Worthington, the president 
of InterAction, criticized the Save Darfur’s proposition as something that “could easily result in 
the deaths of hundreds of thousands of individuals.” In an email to David Rubenstein, 
Worthington wrote that he was “deeply concerned by the inability of Save Darfur to be informed 
by the realities on the ground and to understand the consequences of [its] proposed actions.” 128  
Professional aid organizations believed intervention would have calamitous repercussions and 
advised Washington to avoid intervention.   
The disconnect between professional NGOs and the Save Darfur Coalition captures 
another reason why the pressure from global civil society did not lead to intervention.  Citizen-
led movements such as Save Darfur and STAND, while well-intentioned, generally lacked a 
comprehensive understanding of the conflict, its root causes, and approaches that could be taken 
to resolve it.  Unlike professional human rights workers who earn their paycheck by studying 
crises and can devote substantial time to understanding conflicts, many members of Save Darfur 
had their own jobs and responsibilities that compromised their ability to stay well-informed. 
Because of this, the United States could appease advocates by acting in a limited fashion that, in 
reality, did little to solve the problem.  One State Department official remembers, “it turned into 
a game about numbers- how many troops (AMIS troops) can we deploy? What gets lost is the 
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nuance- like if we don’t have the ten right people in headquarters the whole thing will fall apart.” 
Airlifting Rwandan troops into Sudan “with pictures to show for it,” for example, was an easier 
and less costly way to appease advocate demands than issuing a statement explaining how they 
were working to improve operational methods or logistics.129  However, the same official 
explains how the State Department understood that such actions would barely improve the 
mission, if at all.   
Once it became clear to both the United States and NGOs that AMIS was failing in early 
2006, the discussion shifted toward a possible UN mission in Darfur.  The Save Darfur 
Coalition’s “Million Voices Campaign,” during which citizens mailed one million postcards to 
the White House advocating for the U.S. to “Save Darfur,” was instrumental in pushing 
Washington toward securing a peace agreement between Khartoum and the rebel factions.  The 
United States hoped that with a peace agreement, the UN could deploy a military force and fulfill 
the demands of advocates.  While a peace agreement was eventually signed in 2006, and a UN 
hybrid operation commenced in 2007, American soldiers were never sent overseas.   
Conclusion: 
NGOs and civil society played a fundamental role in getting the United States to refer to 
the Darfur Conflict as genocide by providing important information, thus shaping subsequent 
policy discussions.  Because of Khartoum’s information blackout, this would have been 
impossible without the work of these organizations.  Civil society was also able to pressure 
Congress and the Bush Administration to act in ways it probably would not have otherwise, such 
as by funding AMIS, helping deploy African troops into Sudan, and creating a Special Envoy for 
Sudan.  Similar to civil society organizations in Somalia in the early 1990s, Darfur NGOs were 
able to provide information and pressure that shaped U.S. foreign policy.  However, unlike 	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Somalia organizations, the biggest voices on Darfur were citizen-led groups that lacked a 
comprehensive understanding of the conflict.  Therefore, the U.S. was able to appease demands 
and pressure with limited efforts instead of seriously considering an actual intervention, such as 
by airlifting a few hundred African troops to support AMIS or by sending a little bit more money.  
Furthermore, many groups never even pressured the U.S. to intervene.  
The civil society movement, a necessary condition for intervention, was thus too weak 
and misguided to induce intervention in Darfur.  What about the other conditions for intervention?  
The subsequent sections will discuss how military costs and strategic/security implications also 
influenced U.S. decision-making regarding Darfur.   
Section Two: High Costs in Darfur 
	   In chapter 2, I discussed the role that military costs played in convincing the Bush 
Administration to intervene in Somalia instead of Bosnia.  While the Joint Chiefs of Staff 
certainly perceived an intervention in Somalia to be costly, the estimated deployment paled in 
comparison to what would have been required in Bosnia to be successful.  Therefore, because the 
military costs of a Somalia operation were relatively low, intervention was possible.  
 In Darfur, the circumstances of the conflict and the U.S. response were very different, yet 
the same lesson can be learned.  The perceived military costs of a Darfur intervention were too 
great, discouraging the United States from deploying boots on the ground and demonstrating 
how cost concerns often supersede normative ones. 
The Failure of AMIS 
 Throughout 2004 and the first half of 2005, discussions on Capitol Hill and the 
Department of Defense continued to emphasize the importance of an African solution to an 
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African problem.130  AMIS thus continued to be the primary avenue through which the United 
States could provide support to end the atrocities in the region.  However, not only was the 
operation exceptionally understaffed (by April 2005, the AU had authorized an increase in 
military personnel to 7,731 troops: approximately one soldier per 25 square miles)131, but it was 
also flawed in its intelligence, interoperability, logistics, and air support capacity.132  As 
mentioned in the previous section, the U.S. response to these shortcomings reflected little more 
than “a game about numbers.”133   When asked by Senator Barack Obama at a Foreign Relations 
Committee meeting in September, 2005 what steps the United States was taking to help reinforce 
the AU effort, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Zoellick replied that it was currently working to 
provide 105 Armored Personnel Carriers, 16 experienced contract military observers, and $160 
million in PKO funds to support AMIS, as well as to airlift an additional 1,800 Rwandan troops 
into Darfur.134  Such contributions helped appease advocacy demands for AMIS expansion and 
made it look like the United States was concerned about the crisis, yet as an unnamed State 
Department official explained, “those of us working closest to the AU realized that you could 
expand ten times over and they [AMIS] still wouldn’t have the capacity…we knew we couldn’t 
solve it with more money or more personnel.”135  Retired Lt. Colonel Ron Capps, working in 
Sudan for the State Department, echoed a similar lack of faith in AMIS: “[AMIS] has failed to 
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carry out its mandate and will remain powerless to stop the violence…rebels and militias will 
continue to kill with impunity.”136   
 As it became clearer that AMIS was a failing mission, the United States began looking 
toward other possible approaches to stop the violence.  In the same September committee 
hearing, Obama asked Deputy Secretary Zoellick when the U.S. should use force, and whether it 
was appropriate for a situation like Darfur.  Zoellick’s response was politically-uncontroversial 
and avoided any statements that would commit the U.S. to taking military action.  He affirmed 
that the U.S. “must stand firmly for the non-negotiable demands of human liberty,” but at the 
same time must always “weigh the costs…of intervention” and consider “different strategies to 
advance our principles.”137   Zoellick continued by suggesting cheaper and easier alternatives, 
such as sanctions or diplomatic pressure, as ways to pressure Khartoum into taking steps to end 
the violence.  Yet UN Security Council Resolution 1591, adopted on March 29, 2005, had 
already called for member states to freeze assets and restrict travel against those who “impede 
the peace process,” and insisted that “there can be no military solution to the conflict in 
Darfur.”138   These sanctions had also proven to be unsuccessful in pressuring Sudan to change 
its behavior.  Something else had to be done. 
The Costs of Deployment: Ruling Out Intervention 
   As a first-hand witness to the atrocities being committed in Darfur- the Janjaweed terror 
campaigns, the bombing of villages by the Sudanese government, and the forced displacement of 
over two million Darfuris- Ronald Capps determined that there was only one capable solution: 
military intervention.  In a succinct, provocative memorandum to the State Department in April 	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2006, Capps challenged the current U.S. response and reproached the government for its 
inconsistent approach to the problem: 
We alone have called the atrocities in Darfur genocide. We must lead the coalition 
that will stop it.  We must demonstrate to the world our resolve and determination to 
stop this genocide and to never again let genocide occur…Stopping the violence in 
Darfur will require a military force with first-world leadership, first-world assets, 
and first-world experience…Putting together such a coalition…will require that the 
U.S. government and our military take a lead role…Otherwise, which American 
president will be the one to apologize to the dead of Darfur?139 
The retired officer, who had also been previously deployed in the Iraq War, insisted that the 
problem in Darfur “was so much bigger” than anything he had seen in the Middle East.140  
Yet the United States, as well as the other power players in the international community, 
continued to act just as the “bystanders to genocide” had during the Rwandan crisis a decade 
earlier.141 
 One of the biggest reasons for this was the realization at the Pentagon and in the 
State Department that a U.S. military operation would be extremely costly.  This was 
especially true considering the fact that Omar al-Bashir and the Sudanese government had 
demonstrated their resistance to any Western troops on the ground, believing that what the 
U.S. really wanted was regime change. In the summer of 2004, the Defense Department 
estimated that it would take approximately 35,000 U.S. troops to secure the displaced camps 
inside Darfur and to provide continuous security.  35,000 was already a significant 
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deployment, but this estimate was for a consensual operation.  According to the Pentagon’s 
standard planning procedure for nonconsensual operations, the force deployed must be at 
least three times greater than the opposition to ensure success.  Since there were 
approximately 30,000 Sudanese Army soldiers deployed in Darfur, this would necessitate a 
U.S. operation of close to 100,000 troops. 142    In an interview with Rebecca Hamilton, 
Bush’s National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley explained that the Pentagon was 
extremely unenthusiastic about deploying a force of this magnitude.143 Assistant Secretary 
for African Affairs Jendazi Frazer agreed, claiming that officials in the Department of 
Defense “weren’t keen” about sending such a military force into Darfur.144   
 The negative implications of leading an operation this large were exacerbated by the 
fact that significant American military resources were already being utilized in Iraq and 
Afghanistan.  A report by the Congressional Research Service in 2009 shows that average 
monthly U.S. troop levels in Afghanistan and Iraq were 162,900 in FY2005, the same year 
that AMIS began to truly show its deficiencies.145  After President Bush’s decision in 
January 2007 to deploy five extra Brigade Combat Teams to Iraq, deployment in the two 
countries ballooned to almost 188,000 by FY 2008.146  One unnamed senior U.S. Defense 
Department Official explained that a Darfur deployment would have “meant taking 
resources from elsewhere…for us, institutionally, it was a relief [not to be asked to deploy], 
a weight off the nation in terms of sweat and blood.”147  A force in Darfur would have 
necessarily required redirecting military resources from the Middle East, a course of action 	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that would have been strategically costly to the United States (see next chapter).  Thus, 
because redirecting resources from the War on Terror was impossible through the lens of 
Defense Officials, the prospects of a Darfur intervention presented very serious capacity 
concerns.  Indeed, according to Jendazi Frazer, military planners responded to the Darfur 
deployment estimate by concluding “we don’t have that because of Iraq.”148  
 The military also dismissed any discussion of a smaller deployment.  Just as Powell 
had argued against sending a limited force into Bosnia, Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld cautioned that if a small deployment encountered serious danger, a larger force 
would have to be sent to save them.149  This risked being drawn into a costly protracted 
conflict that the U.S. could not afford to undertake.  Additionally, AMIS had already 
demonstrated that limited force in Darfur would be ineffective.  The only military response 
capable of success was a full-fledged deployment that simply was not viable because of Iraq 
and Afghanistan.   
 Finally, military planners were dissuaded from intervening in Darfur because of concerns 
that there was no clear military solution, and that the operation would last indefinitely and 
continue to incur costs.  Among expert advocates for non-intervention on this basis was Alex de 
Waal.  Citing the ethnic dimension of the fighting, he argued in 2006, “military intervention 
won’t stop the killing…the crisis in Darfur is political.  It’s a civil war, and like all wars it needs 
a political settlement.”150 Instead of deploying troops to enforce peace, de Waal maintained, the 
political differences must be settled through inclusive peace negotiations between the Sudanese 
government and all rebel factions.  Indeed, this is the approach that the U.S. had primarily taken 
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from 2004-2006.  In the hearing before the Committee of Foreign Relations in September 2005, 
Zoellick insisted that a peace agreement in Abuja was the “ultimate solution to violence in 
Darfur.”151   The Bush Administration believed that a peace agreement was essential for a 
transition from AMIS to a United Nations Operation, and Zoellick led a series of negotiations 
between the rebels and the government throughout 2006 with the hope that diplomacy could end 
the fighting.  Military force, on the other hand, was viewed as an ineffective approach that would 
draw the U.S. into a long, costly conflict.  As Stephen Hadley explained, the military viewed 
intervention as “a mission without an end” that would continue to drain resources and risk 
American lives.152  The operation was simply too costly. 
Conclusion:   
 As it became clear that AMIS was a failing operation, the United States began to look at 
other approaches to end the conflict in Darfur.  However, the high costs of intervention 
convinced U.S. military planners that force was not the avenue to be taken.  Not only were 
resources already stressed because of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, but Sudan’s lack of 
consent also meant that a significant deployment was deemed necessary to be successful, 
something that the U.S. could not afford.  As Rebecca Hamilton explains, without Sudanese 
consent a mission would have “logistical and military complications rising near the level of 
practical impossibility,” and “not even the United States was willing to fight a real war with 
[these] real costs”153 Because of this, the United States never seriously considered using military 
force in Sudan. 
Instead, the U.S. pursued a much cheaper alternative: a peace agreement between the 
Sudanese government and rebel factions.  In May 2006, an agreement was finally approved and 	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signed, signaling a hopeful new beginning in relations between Darfur and Khartoum.  However, 
the hope was short-lived.  The Darfur Peace Agreement was fundamentally flawed as it failed to 
secure the approval of the JEM and the entire SLA (which was itself divided into two ethnic 
factions), two prominent rebel groups whose consent was necessary for a successful agreement.  
The only rebel signatory was the ethnic Zaghawa faction of the SLA led by Minni Minawi, who 
in no way represented the interests of the rebels as a whole.  Furthermore, the agreement 
amazingly made no explicit reference to a UN operation.  Instead, the Sudanese government 
assured Deputy Secretary Zoellick that a UN peacekeeping force would be welcomed, regardless 
of its absence in the actual text of the document.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, when the UN passed 
Resolution 1706 in August 2006 that authorized deployment in Darfur, Omar al-Bashir went 
back on his word and rejected the decision.  The president insisted that he would not “consent to 
a resolution that will violate [Sudanese] sovereignty,” and charged the resolution as an 
“unjustifiable hostility against Sudan.”154 He also warned the UN that Darfur would be a 
“graveyard” of foreign troops if a deployment were approved.155  Therefore, while the United 
States saw military intervention as a costly and ineffective approach, the Darfur Peace 
Agreement proved to be a futile effort as well.    
 Section Three: The Negative Security/Strategic Implications in Darfur 
 In the previous section, I demonstrated how the high costs of a non-consensual military 
intervention dissuaded the United States from deploying boots on the ground in Darfur. In this 
section, I will explain how humanitarian intervention in Darfur would also have precipitated, at 
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least from the perspective of the United States, severe security and strategic implications that the 
Bush Administration was not willing to bear. 
Iraq and Afghanistan: Priorities in U.S. Strategy: 
 The Pentagon was never enthusiastic about using U.S. military force in Sudan.  The 
September 11th attacks brought the Middle East to the forefront of U.S. military planning, and 
by 2005 Washington was already heavily invested in two wars in the region.  While Powell had 
officially identified the War in Darfur as genocide, thus holding the United States accountable 
for intervention according to Pillar One of the Responsibility to Protect initiative and the 1948 
Genocide Convention, the prospects of a Darfur intervention continued to take the backseat to 
the Afghanistan and Iraq operations.  As explained in the previous section, the Department of 
Defense did mull over potential military avenues, yet as Assistant Secretary for African Affairs 
Jendayi Frazer explains, it ultimately came to the conclusion that "we don't have [sufficient 
manpower] because of Iraq."156 Other Defense officials echoed the same point of view, citing 
capacity issues because of the Middle East as the primary reason that military intervention was 
impossible.  The United States simply was not willing to compromise its operations in the 
Middle East by responding militarily to Darfur, especially considering the small return that 
would come on such a heavy investment.    
 To some, the future of U.S. humanitarian intervention seems bleak because of such 
strategic considerations.  James Kurth of Swarthmore College explains that the missions in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, while framed and justified as operations to promote human rights 
(especially in Iraq), are more accurately understood as strategic wars rather than humanitarian 
interventions and always take precedent to purely normative missions: "the real impact of [Iraq] 
has been to make humanitarian intervention by the United States elsewhere impossible. This 	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radically reduces the prospects for successful humanitarian interventions in the future, while 
improving the prospects for undeterred and uninhibited ethnic massacres or genocides, such as 
has been occurring in the Western Sudan."157 Therefore, even though the United States had an 
explicitly stated "responsibility to protect," it disregarded these responsibilities in favor of 
continuing its more important objectives in the Middle East.  Redirecting resources and 
manpower from the Middle East to Africa would have negative security and strategic 
implications that the U.S. was not willing to bear. 
 Another prominent explanation that has emerged to explain why the U.S. did not deploy 
troops to Darfur takes Sudanese sovereignty into account.  The Security Council passed UN 
Resolution 1706 in August 2006, authorizing a UN peacekeeping operation as long as the 
Sudanese government gave consent.  After Bashir famously rejected the agreement, contending 
that any UN force would be considered an invasion, the UN was presented with an awkward 
situation: a resolution with terms that could not be met.  However, American respect for 
Khartoum’s sovereignty was not itself the reason the U.S. evaded intervention. In fact, 
sovereignty has not historically been a decisive impediment to U.S. humanitarian intervention.  
As Nicholas J. Wheeler and Alex Bellamy point out, the UNSC did not oppose intervention in 
Rwanda because of its sovereignty, but because of the member states' lack of political will. And 
in 2003, the Bush Administration showed little reluctance to an Iraq invasion, suggesting that 
sovereignty in itself does not preclude humanitarian intervention (though the humanitarian 
motives for intervention Iraq are questionable at best).  Rather, a state's reluctance to undertake 
humanitarian intervention is a result of the costs it may incur, whether it be material (see 
previous section) or strategic.  Wheeler and Bellamy sum up this point neatly in the context of 
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the U.S. 'War on Terror' and Darfur: “…[not only has] the War on Terror fractured the fragile 
consensus over humanitarian intervention…but also the problem of political will continues to 
bedevil effective humanitarian intervention as it did over Rwanda.  The Darfur case suggests that 
the commitment to the War on Terror is making it less likely that [the U.S.] will intervene to 
save strangers in strategically unimportant regions.”158  Strategically, the Middle East was more 
important to the Bush Administration than Darfur.   
The Other Side to Omar al-Bashir: How the President's Cooperation with U.S. Counterterrorism 
Operations made Intervention Strategically Costly: 
  Omar al-Bashir's lack of consent in itself was not a factor that prevented intervention.  
But by violating Sudan's sovereignty, the United States risked something else altogether: 
deploying American troops would have serious ramifications on the relationship between 
Washington and Khartoum.  Sudan's relevance in American foreign policy extended far past the 
Darfur War and issues in South Sudan.  In a classic case of political irony, the murderous Bashir 
also happened to be one of the most cooperative partners in U.S. global counterterrorism 
operations.  He was certainly a tyrant, but through the lens of American policymakers, he was a 
'good tyrant.'  Peter Feaver, Director of Strategic Planning on the National Security Council, 
outlines this view: "on counterterrorism cooperation…Khartoum had gone a long way towards 
meeting our demands…there was a fear that steps we might take to pressure them on Darfur 
would…create problems."159 Former diplomat Timothy Carney takes this rhetoric a step further, 
identifying Sudan as "the key to [the problem of] terrorism" and an ally in the War on Terror.160 
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Indeed, the United States worked closely with Sudanese security officials throughout the 2000s 
while simultaneously condemning the state for its role in Darfur.  In 2005, for example, the CIA 
flew Sudanese National Security Director Salah Abdallah Ghosh to Washington for a debriefing 
on terrorism.  He provided American officials with important information regarding Islamist 
militants training in Sudan in the years before 9/11.  Yet, as The New York Times reported, 
Ghosh and other security officials were the very ones that were "orchestrating Khartoum's crimes 
in Darfur and deploying intelligence units that…carried out targeted killings.”161   
 The United States was thus presented with a tricky situation.  Either it could deploy 
American troops through a U.S.-led intervention or through a United Nations Peacekeeping 
Operation, providing the 'bite' to its 'barks' of genocide yet risking alienating Bashir, or it could 
maintain its strategic relationship with Khartoum by making only limited efforts to stopping the 
killing in Darfur.  The U.S. took the latter approach and instead advocated for a UN operation 
without American soldiers on the ground.  The State Department in 2006 called Sudan "a strong 
partner in the War on Terror," and in 2007 described the U.S.-Sudan counterterrorism 
relationship as "solid.”162  To the U.S., this relationship was not worth risking, even if it meant 
more-or-less ignoring the deaths of over 400,000 Darfuri citizens.   
American Image in the Arab World 
 With the United State's image in the Arab World already arguably at an all-time low, the 
Bush Administration recognized that targeting Sudan and intervening in another Muslim country 
would also be a devastating blow to its reputation.  A military intervention would have 
undoubtedly exacerbated tensions and Muslim aggression against the United States. It would 
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have also raised questions over the legitimacy of the United States' intentions, especially after the 
war in Iraq.  National Security Adviser Stephen Hadley explains that even American allies 
warned Bush to be vigilant: "…Bush was hearing from our allies in the region that if the U.S. 
deployed it would be a lightning rod for al-Qaeda…they didn't like the idea of another U.S. 
intervention in another Muslim country.”163  Omar al-Bashir recognized this as well, and 
threatened to publicly frame any intervention as an invasion.  Strategically, the United States 
could not afford to widen the chasm between the Arab and Western worlds any further, and in 
late 2006 UN Secretary General Kofi Annan began to pursue different avenues for intervention 
that did not involve U.S. deployment. After an onerous period of lobbying, Sudan finally gave 
consent to a new resolution in 2007 calling for a 'hybrid' United Nations/African Union mission.  
On July 31, the Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1769 authorizing the 
deployment of 19,555 military personnel for the operation, known as UNAMID.  The operation’s 
mandate, which still exists today, is to protect civilians, contribute security for humanitarian 
assistance, monitor and verify implementation of agreements, assist an inclusive political process, 
contribute to the promotion of human rights, and monitor the situation along the borders of Chad 
and the Central African Republic.164 Though Annan was successful in getting the resolution to 
pass, the presence of Western troops (except a few from Germany) is notably absent from the 
operation. It continues to be a mostly African-led operation to this day.   
Conclusion: 
 Despite Colin Powell's recognition of the Darfur conflict as genocide in 2004, the United 
States abstained from deploying American troops.  One of the reasons for this was the fear of the 
security and strategic costs that might have been incurred had the U.S. militarily intervened.   	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The two ongoing wars in the Middle East had already consumed significant resources, and a 
Darfur intervention would have required redirecting these resources to an effort that was 
strategically less important.  In the eyes of American policymakers, the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan were more significant to U.S. security than genocide against Africans and deserved 
the full attention of the military.  Additionally, Omar al-Bashir and Khartoum had played an 
increasingly prominent role in American counterterrorism efforts since September 11th, and an 
intervention threatened alienating the Sudanese government and fracturing the strategic bond 
between the two states.  Ultimately, the United States was unwilling to bear these costs.  Finally, 
the U.S. recognized how an intervention in another predominantly Muslim state would further 
damage its image in the Arab World.  Allies in the region warned the United States that 
intervention was not welcome, and that American deployment would fuel anti-American 
sentiment and embolden Al-Qaeda.  Ultimately, the United States prioritized its security and 
strategic interests over protecting Darfuris, and the prospect of negative implications was 
instrumental in dissuading the U.S. from intervening.   
*** 
Chapter Three- Obama’s War: Examining why the United States Agreed to Intervene in 
Libya 
 A leg of the popular uprisings that spread throughout the Arab World in 2011, famously 
dubbed the “Arab Spring,” the Libya Crisis was unique in the fact that it was the first rebel 
movement that was publically supported by the United States.  Beginning in mid-February, the 
revolt was in response to what Chorin calls “a series of deep insults and organized deprivation” 
by the Qaddafi regime.165 Colonel Muammar al-Qaddafi, who rose to power in a 1969 coup, had 
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been a thorn in the United States’ side for over four decades.  Throughout the 1970s, the regime 
was notable for its funding of international terrorist organizations, relationship with the Soviet 
Union, and efforts to acquire nuclear weapons.166 In the 1980s, the United States initiated a trade 
embargo against Libya, supplemented by a bombing campaign, yet fell short of ever removing 
Qaddafi from power.  One reason for this is that Qaddafi began cooperating with the United 
States as the Libyan economy began to suffer, especially after the price of oil, a significant 
source of revenue for Libya, plummeted in the late 1980s.  The 1990s and early 2000s saw 
improved relations between Libya and the West as Qadaffi agreed to give up his WMD program, 
assist with U.S. counterterrorism operations, and pay compensation for the victims of the 
infamous Pan Am bombings (to which Libya was linked).  Thus, while the United States was 
pursuing regime change in Iraq by 2003, Qaddafi’s seat in Libya appeared unchallenged.   
 By 2011, much had changed.  In 2010, the regime began cracking down on personal 
liberties, increasing censorship of foreign news websites and blocking Youtube videos of 
protests and growing discontent in Benghazi.167  In February 2011, Ibrahim Sahad, the Secretary 
General for the National Front for the Salvation of Libya (a Libyan opposition group), issued an 
international “call to action,” organizing protests against Qaddafi in capitals throughout Europe 
and in Washington D.C.  Sahad’s optimism to incite change was undercut by what he perceived 
to be a closing window of opportunity to dispose the Libyan leader: “we knew we likely had a a 
single shot…in which to cripple the regime. We would not have a second chance.”168  However, 
Sahad’s fears never came to fruition.  Organized protests and Qaddafi’s attempts to quell any 
uprisings attracted media attention and brought the problems in Libya to the international 
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large groups, and released criminals from jails on the grounds that they would fight protesters.  It 
also began issuing subsidies to Libyan citizens in an attempt to appease protesters.  Instead of 
discouraging the opposition, these moves strengthened the rebels’ discontent.  On February 16, 
the regime used force against protests in Maidan al Shajara, killing many people.  Over the 
course of the next month, Qaddafi’s forces clashed violently with the opposition as protesters 
refused to concede.  Meanwhile, a humanitarian crisis began to materialize.  Food and medicine 
in Tripoli were becoming increasingly difficult to find, and many people attempted to flee to 
Tunisia.  On February 25, the International Red Cross warned of the “number of people leaving 
their homes in search of safety.”169  
 Believing that he was immune from Western intervention, Qaddafi set his forces on 
Benghazi in early March to “create a swath of coastal control from the Tunisian border to Marsa 
Brega, with a focus on the cities.”170  The loyalist forces commonly used bombing and 
helicopters.  As Qaddafi’s forces seemed to be gaining the advantage, the United States began to 
feel pressure to act.  In mid-March, the UN voted in favor of Resolution 1973, authorizing a 
NATO led intervention to protect civilians in Libya.  If my hypotheses hold true, I would expect 
to see a strong global civil society providing information and pressure upon the U.S. to act, low 
relative material costs, and benign strategic and security implications resulting from intervention.  
The evidence suggests that these conditions were all present in Libya.   
Section One: Global Civil Society in Libya 
 Non-governmental organizations and individuals played a prominent role in the Obama 
Administration’s decision-making process regarding intervention in Libya.  Similar to the role of 
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NGOs in Somalia, these actors highlighted the atrocities being committed by the Qaddafi regime, 
provided the administration with key information that influenced policy discussions, and 
petitioned the administration to act.  As I will argue in the following section, this global civil 
society network was instrumental in reaching the Obama administration on both emotional and 
pragmatic levels, convincing decision-makers that intervention was not only the morally sound 
avenue, but also one that was politically feasible.   
The Role of the National Transitional Council (NTC), Organizations, and Libyan Citizens 
 Only a few days after the beginning of the uprising, Libyan rebels began organizing into 
a more cohesive coalition with common objectives and demands.  The original group, known as 
the 17th February Coalition, issued a statement calling for Saif Gaddafi’s promises of a new 
constitution and limited reforms to be fulfilled, and later for his father’s removal from power 
altogether.  Only a week later, academic Fathi Mohammed Baja, writer Mohammad Al Mufti, 
and Saleh Al Ghazaal published a formal manifesto outlining the coalition’s intentions.  
According to Baja, the document, called the Bayan, expressed “that our problem…was not only 
economic, but a question of freedom and respect.”171  It was also, as a senior US diplomat stated, 
an important step in convincing the Obama Administration that the rebel group was a legitimate 
organization that could be trusted.172   In addition to the United States, other members of the 
international community began to accept the coalition, which eventually evolved into the 
National Transitional Council (NTC), as the legitimate governing body. On February 21, Libyan 
representatives to the United Nations pledged their support to the rebels and demanded that the 
Libyan army assist with the removal of Qadaffi. Amazingly, this support came a mere four days 
after the first government-supported attack on protesters.  
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 Meanwhile, NGOs and news organizations operating in Libya played an important role in 
reporting the atrocities on the ground and pressuring the U.S. to take action.  For example, on 
February 21st, a group of 70 NGOs sent a letter to the United States urging it to “take immediate 
action to halt the mass atrocities now being perpetuated by the government of Libya on its own 
people.”173  On February 25th, the International Red Cross described the worsening humanitarian 
crisis, warning of the “number of people leaving their homes in search of safety and trying to 
cross the border (into an already unstable Tunisia).174  A few days later, Al Jazeera reported that 
the death toll was reaching 1,000, and that medical supplies and food were running short.175  
Sometimes, the reports of these organizations contradicted U.S. intelligence.  For instance, on 
February 21st Al Jazeera reported a government counteroffensive backed by fighter jets and live 
ammunition against protesters in Tripoli.176 On the same day, The Guardian published an article 
describing the defection of two high-ranking Libyan Air Force pilots who fled into Malta rather 
than “carry out orders to bomb civilians.”177  Even the Human Rights Watch reported air attacks 
by the government, such as the use of Red-Cross marked helicopters to fire at aid convoys.178  
Reports such as these reached the ears of United States decision-makers, despite Secretary of 
Defense Robert Gates’ assertion that “we had seen no evidence that Qaddafi was using aircraft to 
fire on the rebels.”179  By late February and early March, the NTC was busy drafting a new 	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statement of principles that called for, among other things, the enforcement of a no-fly zone in 
Libya by outside powers, and strikes against Qaddafi.180   
The reports of government-sponsored air attacks by organizations on the ground, and by 
the National Transitional Council, likely influenced the opinions of key decision-makers within 
the U.S.  Indeed, according to Chorin, U.S. decision-makers at the time were not entirely sure 
exactly what was developing on the ground and relied on a variety of reports, including Qaddafi 
speeches, to shape their policy approaches.181 Despite repeated concerns by Gates and Chairman 
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Mike Mullen that there was no evidence of Qaddafi backed airstrikes, 
and that enforcing and sustaining a no-fly zone would be extremely costly, Congressmen and 
officials within the Obama Administration continued advocating for such a military approach 
based on what they were hearing from organizations on the ground in Libya.  On March 1, John 
McCain criticized the administration for not acting with haste, arguing, “of course we need to 
have a no-fly zone...don’t tell me we can’t do a no-fly zone over Tripoli.”182 Republican Senator 
Mitch McConnell and Independent Senator Joseph Lieberman offered similar views.183   
Perhaps the most influential decision makers in the pro-intervention camp were National 
Security Council director Samantha Power and UN ambassador Susan Rice.  Power, a former 
journalist and author, was a well-known critic of the United States for its traditionally apathetic 
response to humanitarian crises in the past.  Her book A Problem from Hell: America and the 
Age of Genocide provided a comprehensive study of humanitarian crises, most notably in 
Rwanda and Bosnia, and the markedly limited efforts the U.S. took to combat the problems.  
Even before her role as NSC director, Power firmly believed that the United States should take a 
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more active role to help alleviate humanitarian disasters, rather than directing its policy goals 
only toward “promoting a narrowly defined set of U.S. economic and security interests.”184  Rice, 
who had been an adviser to Clinton on Africa during the Rwandan genocide, held similar 
convictions as Power.  Believing that she could have done more to push for intervention in 1994, 
Rice resolved not to make the same mistake twice.  Both women advocated for a no-fly zone in 
Libya, with Power commenting post-intervention that it would have been “extremely chilling, 
deadly” had the U.S. not taken such a step.185 Again, the call for a no-fly zone reflected the pleas 
of the NTC, and the reports by news organizations of Qadaffi using air power against civilians, 
rather than U.S. intelligence.  As Gates explained in a press conference in early March, “we’ve 
seen the press reports but there’s no confirmation [of Qadaffi using air power on rebels].”186     
Despite Gates’ qualms, the Obama Administration continued to listen to the National 
Transitional Council because they saw it as a legitimate interlocutor with clearly stated 
objectives.  After the NTC requested a no-fly zone from the United States, the proposed solution 
became a hot discussion point within decision-making circles.  In the words of Chorin, “a critical 
step in the formation of U.S. policy toward the evolving situation in Libya was the articulation of 
a set of specific criteria in support of intervention, including legitimate local leadership that 
could convincingly articulate their needs (italics added).”187  The non-governmental group 
formed a network with U.S. policymakers and was able to provide important information and 
policy pressure that influenced the eventual decision to intervene.   
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Focusing solely on the influence of the rebel coalition, however, ignores the role that the 
broader Libyan community played in pressuring the United States to intervene.  As the violence 
worsened, Libyans in both the U.S. and on the ground in Libya placed “many, many” calls to the 
State Department urging the Obama Administration to act immediately.188  Obama himself was 
emotionally moved by the plight and pleas of the Libyans, and recognized the moral 
responsibilities of the United States to end the suffering.  At the final meeting discussing 
intervention, Obama joined the humanitarian camp and reasoned, “acting would be the right 
thing to do, because we have the responsibility to prevent a massacre, and we’ve been asked to 
do it by the people of Libya.”189  An unnamed White House official echoes this same view: “a 
city of 700,000 is facing indiscriminate slaughter. That’s what moved the president.”190  Obama 
was influenced by genuinely altruistic concerns, and by the requests of the NTC and the Libyan 
community as a whole. Though the intervention fell out of U.S. strategic interests (according to 
Gates and the anti-intervention camp), it posed greater moral questions that the Obama 
Administration believed the U.S. should be committed to addressing.  The NTC, NGOs, news 
organizations, and Libyan activists certainly played a role in making these questions resonate in 
Washington.   
The Role of “Non-Governmental Individuals”: “The French Catalyst” and Mahmoud Jibril 
 Individuals also played a pivotal role in convincing the Obama Administration to 
intervene in Libya.  One of the most prominent “non-governmental individuals” that influenced 
policy was Bernard-Henri Lévy, a flamboyant French intellectual that Chorin aptly nicknames 
“The French Catalyst.”  Feeling an obligation to support the Libyan rebels, Lévy, working 
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outside the auspices of any government agency and with only a loose plan, connected with 
President Sarkozy and secured an audience for an NTC delegation. Lévy was surprised at 
Sarkozy’s immediate consent, explaining that it was “as if [the president] found it perfectly 
natural receive a proposal for the official recognition of a newly formed power of which nothing, 
to date, was known other than it was rebelling against the all-powerful government in Tripoli.”191 
Sarkozy nevertheless met with two NTC representatives- Ali Essaoui, Qaddafi’s ex-finance 
minister, and Mahmoud Jibril, the former head of Libya’s National Economic Development 
Board- and on March 10 formally recognized the coalition as the legal representative of Libya.  
Less than a week later, France was pressuring NATO to act. Though there is some speculation as 
to whether Sarkozy was acting upon more self-interested objectives (for example, taking the 
opportunity to be more proactive in the Arab Spring development, or to improve low poll ratings 
at home), Lévy still played an important role in convincing France to take the “first tangible, 
decisive steps toward isolating Qaddafi and creating an actionable international consensus.”192  
According to Gates, France’s demonstration of leadership pressured the United States to take the 
lead role at the United Nations in organizing an operation against Qaddafi.193  “The French 
Catalyst” was therefore a key figure in pushing the international community to act.   
 After working with the Sarkozy government to influence French policy, Lévy turned his 
sights to the United States.  On March 14, Lévy organized a meeting in Paris between Secretary 
of State Hilary Clinton and Jibril.  The NTC representative lobbied for the United States to 
enforce a no-fly zone over Libya, yet Clinton and other American officials were still hesitant.  
While the Arab League had also petitioned for a no-fly zone, the group had simultaneously 
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rejected the idea of foreign intervention in Libya.194  This was an inhibiting condition to 
American intervention, as the Obama Administration was carefully avoiding stepping on the toes 
of regional organizations and the Arab World, fearful of the political costs of another unwanted 
military effort in another Arab country (see chapter 9 for greater discussion).  However, Jibril 
seemed to appease most of Clinton’s concerns and convinced her to push for intervention.  An 
unidentified associate of Clinton told Lévy that “[Jibril] had reached Hilary on a very 
fundamental level; that he had caught the attention of Clinton the political animal, but also…the 
female instinct within her.”195 The following day, Clinton briefed Obama in an advisers meeting 
that after her discussion with Jibril, she believed the Arab League would support a no-fly zone 
over Libya, and that NATO could lead a bombing campaign against Qaddafi’s airforce and 
aircraft carrier.196 Jibril’s lobbying was crucial, especially considering that many members of the 
administration at the time were still unconvinced of an impending massacre in Benghazi (despite 
Qaddafi publically threatening to kill “the rats” in Benghazi).197 
 On March 17, President Obama announced that he had come down on the side of 
intervention and the United States began working on a Security Council resolution.  Ultimately, 
it was determined that a no-fly zone by itself was insufficient, and after significant lobbying from 
Susan Rice at the United Nations, a resolution was adopted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
that authorized the use of “all means necessary” by NATO to protect civilians. Motivated by 
moral considerations, and by the relatively low costs of intervention compared to the costs of 
non-intervention (see next chapters), the president set an important precedent regarding the use 
of American military force post-Iraq and post-R2P.  Global civil society played an extremely 	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important role in guiding U.S. policy through the information it provided, the pressure it 
presented, and the policies it prescribed. 
Conclusion 
 As the humanitarian crisis worsened in Libya, non-governmental groups and individuals 
worked to influence U.S. policy.  NGOs, news organizations, and the NTC provided the U.S. 
with important information that shaped the discourse in Washington.  This is even more 
remarkable considering that some of this information contradicted the views of the Department 
of Defense.  These organizations also pressured the U.S. to alleviate the crisis, raising questions 
of moral responsibility and touching the heartstrings of important decision-makers.  Finally, non-
governmental organizations and individuals, in particular Mahmoud Jibril, convinced the United 
States that it had the regional support that it needed to intervene, quieting concerns of a 
politically destructive unwelcome intervention.  Global civil society was the catalyst that pushed 
the Libyan humanitarian crisis into the United States’ agenda.  However, as I will demonstrate in 
the following two sections, the relatively low material costs and benign security implications of 
intervention were also necessary conditions for the U.S. to intervene in Libya.  
Section Two: Low Costs in Libya 
In his memoirs, Robert Gates writes, “when considering military intervention, presidents 
virtually never consider the cost- Obama included, when it came to Libya.”198  His comment 
contradicts one of the main discoveries of this study, namely that presidents will not intervene in 
humanitarian crises unless the costs are relatively low.  However, upon further reflection, it 
becomes clear that costs played an extremely important role in the decision-making process 
regarding intervention in Libya: the mandate was limited, U.S. leadership was to be scaled back 
after the initial attack, and the military costs were to be shared between different states.  The 	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evidence suggests that intervention was only decided on after discussing the military costs, and 
that low costs were a prerequisite for intervention. 
 
Considering the Costs- No Nation Building 
 Contrary to Gates’ assertion, the White House was highly attentive to the costs of 
intervention and the potential for disaster.  On March 6, National Security Advisor Thomas E. 
Donilon organized a group at the NSC to begin planning for a post-Qaddafi Libya.  The group 
discussed potential scenarios that might arise if the United States supported the rebels against the 
Qaddafi regime, asking questions such as “how messy will this be? Will there be a civil war, or a 
more linear downfall that allows time to set up a new government? Will a U.N. Peacekeeping 
force be required, and if so, how many soldiers will it need?”199 Tony Blinkin, a high-ranking 
official in the NSC, wondered what would come next if Qaddafi was overthrown- would 
intervention make things worse?200 As Michael Hastings explains, these types of discussions 
were noticeably absent before the Iraq intervention, and were meant to prevent a repeat of the 
costly nation building responsibilities that the United States had assumed after overthrowing 
Saddam.201  Regime change is easy; nation building is not. The White House wanted to be sure it 
knew what it was getting into before agreeing on intervention.   
 These concerns undoubtedly influenced the intervention’s mandate.  There was 
considerable pressure on President Obama, especially from Congress, to make regime change an 
objective of the intervention.  Senator John McCain and House Representative Buck McKeon 
were particularly vocal about overthrowing Qaddafi.  As were Elliot Abrams and Paul Wolfowitz, 
who co-signed a letter in February with 40 others urging the Obama Administration to pursue 	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regime change.  However, the mandate that the White House agreed upon was markedly limited 
and was aimed at checking American interference in post-conflict Libya.  It authorized using air 
power to destroy Qaddafi’s air force and establish a no-fly zone, as well as protect citizens by 
bombing control and commands centers, but fell short of overthrowing Qaddafi.  According to 
Obama, “broadening our military mission to include a regime change would be a mistake.”202  
Not only would regime change threaten the intervening coalition and the strong international 
support for intervention- including sanction from the Arab League, NATO, UN, and Gulf 
Cooperation Council- but it would also require the U.S. to play a role in Libya’s transition to 
democracy.  Obama explained in a speech to the American public on March 28 that this would 
require deploying American boots on the ground, and augment “the costs and our share of 
responsibility for what comes next.”203  He cited Iraq as an example of regime change gone awry, 
explaining that the United States could not afford being dragged into another trillion-plus dollar 
quagmire. Not everybody was content with the limited mandate.  At a hearing with the House 
and Senate Armed Services Committee, Gates and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Michael 
Mullin were bombarded with complaints about the limitations of the military mission.204  
However, the White House adhered to its belief that limiting the scope of the intervention and its 
operational costs was essential.  Indeed, after NTC militias killed Qaddafi in October, the United 
States pursued a postwar approach in Libya suitably referred to by the Rand Corporation as the 
“light-footprint strategy.” The strategy emphasized taking a low-profile approach through a small 
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U.N. political mission, while delegating the majority of postwar operations to the Libyans 
themselves.205  Another costly postwar operation was simply out of the question.   
Splitting the Costs 
 One of Gates’ biggest concerns about intervention was the cost of declaring a no-fly zone, 
and uncertainty about how long it would take to implement and sustain.   He was particularly 
critical of the White House for leading military discussions without consulting the Department of 
Defense, and worried that Washington only superficially understood the costs of the options 
being proposed: “The White House has no idea how many resources will be required.  This 
administration has jumped to military options before it even knows what to do.”206  During a 
House Appropriations Defense Subcommittee hearing, the Secretary of Defense testified “[a no-
fly zone] is more than just signing a piece of paper…it’s a big operation in a big country.”207  
From Gates’ perspective, the White House was resorting to military options without seriously 
considering how much it would cost, and humanitarianists leading the discussions such as 
Samantha Power were prioritizing moral responsibilities over operational practicality.   
 However, Gates’ criticisms ignore Obama’s preconditions for intervention that were 
heavily rooted in costs.  The first condition was that no American ground forces were to be used.  
This meant that ground units would not be redirected from Iraq or Afghanistan, and that the 
Army would not be stretched (a significant concern during the Darfur decision-making process).  
Secondly, the intervention was to be under NATO auspices.  Not only did a NATO coalition 
indicate that there was international support for intervention, but it also allowed for burden 
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sharing between the participating states.  The evidence indicates that burden sharing was a 
particularly important precondition for intervention.  The United States was tasked with taking 
the lead in destroying Qaddafi’s air defenses, but after the initial bombing campaign it was to 
scale back its involvement and assist NATO by providing only what the “U.S. military ‘uniquely’ 
possessed…that would enable other allies to take the lead.”208  American contributions were 
significant- including intelligence, fueling, and targeting capabilities- but so were the 
contributions of the other participants.  The coalition consisted of 14 NATO member states and 
four outside partners.  France and the United Kingdom offered over 40 percent of the sorties and 
destroyed over one-third of the overall targets.  Italy contributed aircraft for reconnaissance 
missions, and together with Greece provided access to air bases.  Belgium, Canada, Norway, 
Denmark, and the UAE all deployed combat fighters.  Jordan, the Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, 
Turkey and Qatar all assisted with maintaining the no-fly zone.209  The Obama Administration 
was careful not to lead the United States into another military conflict in which it would bear the 
brunt of the costs.  Indeed, Time Magazine’s Fareed Zakaria writes that “compared to the wars in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, the Libya operation was a bargain.”210  Compared to the $1.3 trillion 
collective cost of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, the invoice of the Libya intervention for the 
United States was “only” $1 billion.  This was, in fact, lower than some estimates of the UK’s 
contributions (The Guardian, for example, suggests that the UK spent between one and two 
billion USD on Libya), and not much higher than the $700 million USD from Italy.211  It is 
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unlikely that the U.S. would have intervened had it not been supported militarily by these other 
states.  Gates even admits, “it was clear that the president was not going to act alone…he wanted 
any military operations to be under NATO auspices.”212  Again likely influenced by Iraq, Obama 
saw multilateralism as the only viable avenue for intervention, effectively distancing himself 
from the unilateralist approach that characterized the Bush years.   
Conclusion 
 The war in Libya continued until October, seven months after the initial bombing 
campaign.  During this period, the initial limited mandate evolved into “a more sweeping and 
aggressive push for regime change.”213  Although some might argue that overthrowing Qaddafi 
was the political goal of the United States from the very beginning, the evidence suggests that 
the Obama Administration genuinely believed the intervention would be short, easy, and 
relatively uncostly.  In the words of an unnamed White House source, “we thought it was going 
to be quick.”214 
 The Obama Administration would not have intervened in Libya had the perceived costs 
been greater.  Intervention was conditional on a limited mandate, a coalition to share the 
operational burdens, and the prediction that direct military involvement would be relatively short.  
Contrary to Gates’ assertion, Obama and the White House were concerned about how 
intervention would hurt the wallet- low perceived costs were absolutely essential.   
Section Three: Benign Security/Strategic Implications in Libya: 
 By 2011, the United States was approaching almost a decade of military involvement in 
the Middle East.  The wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had strained relations between the U.S. and 
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the Muslim World, as well as undermined American credibility in the region.215  Indeed, the 
reluctance to intervene in Darfur in the mid-2000s can be partly attributed to the Bush 
Administration’s misgivings about becoming involved in another Muslim country (see chapter 6, 
especially National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley’s quote).  Five years later, there was a new 
president in the White House and a new administration, yet the same concerns continued to 
linger.  The Libya crisis presented the Obama Administration with a political and strategic 
quandary.  How would the Muslim World react to another American military intervention in 
another Muslim state? Would intervention negatively affect American security and power vis-à-
vis its credibility in the region?  These concerns weighed heavily in the minds of decision-
makers, yet it soon became clear that the circumstances of the Libya conflict were fundamentally 
different than in Darfur.  In this chapter, I will demonstrate that the Obama Administration 
realized not only that intervention would not undermine security and strategic interests, but also 
that inaction would be strategically costly.  Because of this, intervention was more than just 
feasible- it was strategically important.   
Broad International Support for Intervention 
 According to one U.S. senior administration official involved with the deliberations, 
“there was a certain wariness to get involved militarily in another Muslim country.”216 Some U.S. 
decision-makers, Robert Gates included, were likely influenced by the course of events leading 
up to the Iraq invasion in 2003 and were reluctant to lead another intervention without 
international sanction. At a NATO defense ministers meeting on March 10, Gates told Secretary 
General Anders Rasmussen that the United States would be willing to plan for a no-fly zone, but 	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that a UN Security Council Resolution and “explicit regional participation” were necessary 
stipulations before any military action would be taken: “this can’t be seen as a bunch of 
Americans and Europeans intervening in a sovereign Arab state without sanction.”217 With the 
criticisms of Iraq still ringing in his ears, Gates insisted that the United States must be able to 
first justify intervention as a humanitarian operation and not simply an extension of U.S. military 
might for self-interested reasons.  In particular, the Secretary of Defense wanted the U.S. to be 
able to answer certain questions that might be asked, such as why it was intervening in Libya 
instead of other states, or whether the operation was motivated by oil interests.218  A repeat of the 
Iraq debacle, an intervention without broad international support, was out of the question. 
 The Gulf Cooperation Council was the first prominent international organization to voice 
support for a no-fly zone in Libya, offering the very kind of regional support that the United 
States was waiting for.  On March 8, the organization called for the UN Security Council to 
implement a no-fly zone, a maneuver that Chorin calls “a bold step.”219 Two days later, NATO 
showed its support for military action.  After the March 10th meeting, most defense ministers 
were supportive of intervention.220  Germany was a notable exception, as it opposed relocating 
some ships, although Supreme Allied Commander Europe James G. Stavridis had the ability to 
do this on his own accord.  Despite this, the United States and NATO remained reluctant to act 
without the support of the Arab League. 
 Without Arab League sanction, the United States feared repeating the same mistakes of 
the Iraq intervention.  The Obama Administration understood that an unwelcomed military 
operation in Libya could “turn out to be prolonged and complex,” inducing significant material 
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costs as well as further undermining American credibility in the region.221  However, on March 
11 the 22-nation Arab League finally pledged support for a UN intervention, “an extremely rare 
invitation for Western military forces on Arab territory.”222  Amr Moussa, the Secretary General 
of the organization, justified the decision on humanitarian grounds, explaining that the Arab 
League sought an end to the bloodshed against innocent Libyan citizens.  It was also partly a 
response to negative comments that Qadaffi’s son, Seif al-Islam al-Qaddafi, had made about the 
Arab League, as well as a general loathing of Qaddafi in the Gulf.223 Regardless of the motives 
for the decision, the Arab League’s sanction not only made it possible for the United States and 
Europe to push for a strong Security Council resolution against objections from Russia and 
China, but it also pressured the U.S. to take a lead role in the military campaign.  The Arab 
League’s endorsement of Western deployment in the region starkly contrasted the situation in 
Darfur in the mid-2000s, when the Arab World strongly opposed U.S. intervention.  The United 
States recognized the significance of the endorsement.  In his memoirs, Robert Gates explains, 
“the action of the Arab League…persuaded the President that the United States would need to 
take the lead at the U.N. and in organizing the military campaign to stop Qaddafi.”224  Chorin 
offers a similar perspective: “a critical step in the formation of U.S. policy…was strong regional 
(Arab) support.”225  Soon after the Arab League’s statement, the White House released a 
message stating, “we welcome this important step by the Arab League…the international 
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community is unified in sending a clear message that the violence in Libya must stop.”226  With 
broad international and regional support, the United States did not face the same strategic 
implications of intervention that it had during the Darfur crisis.  Intervention would not 
exacerbate tensions between the U.S. and Arab World, nor undermine its legitimacy in the region 
and in the international community at large.  Rather, it provided an opportunity to work with the 
Arab League to pursue a common goal. 
The Image of America and American Credibility: More than a “Rhetorical Construct” 
  In a 2009 speech in Cairo, President Obama promised that the United States would take 
a new approach to the Middle East, characterized by a respect for human rights and democratic 
ideals and not “the crude stereotype of a self-interested empire.”227  Yet as the Arab Spring- 
beginning in Tunisia and spreading to Egypt, and then Libya- provided an opportunity for the 
U.S. to show its dedication to upholding these values, the Obama Administration seemed to balk.  
This was especially true for the uprisings in states with governments friendly to the United States, 
including Egypt and Bahrain.  Michael Hastings explains, “the Obama Administration was slow 
to distance itself from the oil-rich autocrats the U.S. had supported for decades.  In 
Egypt…Biden downplayed the democratic revolt, saying he didn’t consider Hosni Mubarek a 
‘dictator.’  In Bahrain…the administration looked the other way…To Arab protesters, Obama’s 
‘new beginning’ seemed more like the same old American realpolitik.”228   
 The United States’ seemingly apathetic response to the concerns of Arab protesters thus 
threatened the image of America that Obama had promised to promote.  Indeed, officials in the 
White House recognized the danger this would pose to American credibility, especially in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  226	  Richard	  Leiby	  and	  Muhammad	  Mansour,	  “Arab	  League	  Asks	  U.N.	  for	  No-­‐fly	  Zone	  Over	  Libya,”	  Washington	  
Post,	  March	  12,	  2011.	  	  Accessed	  March	  3,	  2014	  http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/arab-­‐league-­‐asks-­‐un-­‐for-­‐no-­‐fly-­‐zone-­‐over-­‐libya/2011/03/12/ABoie0R_story.html	  227	  Chorin,	  Exit	  the	  Colonel,	  209	  228	  Hastings,	  “Inside	  Obama’s	  War	  Room,”	  1	  
Purinton	  84	  	  
Middle East, and they saw Libya as an opportunity to prove American resolve to democratic 
values and human rights.  On March 15, Hillary Clinton traveled to Egypt to meet with a 
coalition of Egyptian youth groups.  After the coalition refused to meet with her, Clinton 
remarked to several State Department officials “we didn’t get off to a great start with Egypt- let’s 
reverse that with Libya.”229 According to Hastings, President Obama shared a similar sentiment, 
believing that intervention in Libya could compensate for the “slow-footed response to the Arab 
Spring.”230  It was important to the Obama Administration that Libyans, and the world at large, 
understood that American involvement in the Middle East to promote democratic values would 
be more than simply rhetoric.231   
Inaction therefore would have been costly to the United States. It would have undermined 
American credibility, which is inherently related to power.232  As the theory of credibility 
explains, if state A can convince state B to follow a course of action that state A prefers, state A 
is demonstrating its “soft power” over state B.  Soft power is important, as it can allow a state to 
influence international politics at an extremely low price.  The idea is that if a state signals its 
resolve, it will not have to utilize its military or instill economic sanctions, actions that can be 
costly to the state.  In the context of the Libya crisis, intervention indicated to the world that the 
U.S. would fight to uphold the values that it promoted rather than simply ignoring violations 
when it was inconvenient.  This was important for two reasons.  First, as explained above, it 
reinforced the image of the U.S. that Obama had promised in his “new beginnings” speech in 
Cairo, thus improving American credibility and legitimacy in the eyes of the Middle East and 
paving the way for, potentially, better relations between the U.S. and Middle East.  Secondly, it 	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made a statement to other regimes in the Middle East that the United States would not tolerate 
human rights abuses, and would even resort to using military force if necessary.   
 This second point was particularly important to the Obama Administration in regards to 
handling Iran. Iran was the proverbial elephant in the room in discussions about Libya: the 
decisions made regarding intervention in Libya would undoubtedly have important implications 
regarding Tehran’s treatment of its own protesters. Clinton was concerned about the kind of 
message that inaction in Libya would send to Iran, namely that “America was so afraid of 
committing its military to protect Muslims and Arabs that it would allow virtually anything to 
happen.”233  Jay Solomon of The Wall Street Journal iterates a similar point: “President Barack 
Obama’s decision last week to use military force against…Qaddafi’s forces was made in part by 
his administration’s fear that Western inaction could further embolden Tehran.234  If the United 
States and Western bloc allowed Qaddafi to regain control over Benghazi, it would have 
communicated to Iran that leaders who are more lenient toward protesters, such as Mubarak in 
Egypt, will be disposed of, while regimes that respond with brutal crackdowns will be allowed to 
remain in power.  By intervening, the United States was able to demonstrate its resolve and 
steadfast opposition to violence against protesters.  But perhaps more importantly, it was sending 
the message to Tehran that the regime would not be permitted to act freely without repercussions, 
including pursuing a nuclear weapons program.  According to National Security Advisor 
Thomas E. Donilon, “[Iran] would interpret a failure to back up [Obama’s] declaration 
that…Qaddafi had “lost the legitimacy to lead” as a sign of weakness- and perhaps a signal that 
Mr. Obama was equally unwilling to back up his vow never to allow Iran to gain the ability to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  233	  Marc	  Ambinder,	  “Obama’s	  First	  New	  War.”	  234	  Michael	  Crowley,	  “Is	  Libya	  Really	  About	  Iran?,”	  Time,	  March	  22,	  2011.	  Accessed	  March	  1,	  2014.	  http://swampland.time.com/2011/03/22/is-­‐libya-­‐really-­‐about-­‐iran/	  
Purinton	  86	  	  
gain a nuclear weapon.”235  Inaction would thus have dangerous strategic and security 
implications that the United States wanted to avoid.   
Conclusion  
 During the Darfur crisis and the UN planning period for intervention, Kofi Annan 
recognized that Western troops could not be deployed “because of the environment in the 
aftermath of Iraq and perceptions in the Islamic World, which Bashir presented very well.”236 
These perceptions had changed, albeit not completely, by the Libyan revolution in 2011.  The 
Arab World welcomed U.S. military involvement to protect Libyan citizens, calling on the U.N. 
to implement a no-fly zone in an “extremely rare” move.237  The United States therefore 
recognized that intervention would not exacerbate tensions between itself and the Arab World.  
Rather, it would demonstrate U.S. resolve to protect human rights and democratic values that 
Obama had promised in his 2009 speech in Cairo.  Simply put, the negative security and strategic 
implications that would have resulted from intervention in Darfur did not exist in Libya.   
 Furthermore, by demonstrating resolve, the United States made a statement to Iran and 
other regimes in the region that it would be willing to resort to force if the government violently 
cracked down on protesters.  Libya was, for all intents and purposes, an ally of the United States 
in 2011.  Qaddafi had complied with U.S. demands to give up its WMD capabilities, and had 
instilled mild reforms in Libya during the 2000s.  This made it all the more spectacular that the 
United States assisted the rebels, signaling that not even allied governments were immune from 
American opposition.  By proving resolve, Obama and the U.S. also demonstrated its credibility 
in backing up rhetoric with action, especially in regards to preventing Iran from obtaining a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  235David	  E.	  Sanger,	  “The	  Larger	  Game	  in	  the	  Middle	  East:	  Iran,”	  New	  York	  Times,	  April	  2,	  2011.	  	  Accessed	  March	  2,	  2014	  http://www.nytimes.com/2011/04/03/weekinreview/03sanger.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0	  236	  Hamilton,	  Fighting	  for	  Darfur,	  127	  237Bronner	  and	  Sanger,	  “Arab	  League	  Endorses	  No-­‐Flight	  Zone.”	  
Purinton	  87	  	  
nuclear weapon.  Intervention in Libya thus not only lacked significant strategic and security 
costs, but also had important strategic benefits.  Inaction was simply too costly.   
 
Analysis and Conclusion: 
 The results of this case study confirm the initial hypotheses: the United States will only 
intervene if there is a global civil society network providing information and pressure upon the 
government to intervene, the material costs are relatively low, and the security/strategic 
implications are benign.  The U.S. will forego intervention if these conditions are not fulfilled.  I 
will conclude this study by briefly recapping each of my conditions and by summarizing their 
importance in the context of each crisis, followed by a discussion of the causal relationship 
between my independent variable (the three conditions) and dependent variable (humanitarian 
intervention).  I will then end by commenting on what this says about realism, constructivism, 
and the importance of the humanitarian norm. 
 As Keck and Sikkink point out, transnational non-governmental actors can play a 
prominent role in influencing state policy by serving as advocacy networks.  To recap, they 
propose four tactics commonly employed by networks: information politics, symbolic politics, 
leverage politics, and accountability politics.  We see these methods utilized by global civil 
society in the crises presented in this study.  In Somalia, NGOs continued operating on the 
ground even after the violence expelled most government agencies.  They worked with OFDA 
and Jan Westcott to relay information to the most important decision-makers in Washington, 
highlighting the atrocities and worsening humanitarian conditions and painting them in ways that 
demonstrated the urgent need for outside action.  Additionally, media agencies brought the crisis 
to the American public, mobilizing humanitarianists and increasing pressure on the Bush 
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Administration to intervene.  Though Strobel insists the policy wheels were already in motion 
before the media began regularly covering the crisis, the media nevertheless augmented public 
interest and probably forced Bush to act quicker than he would have otherwise. Finally, the 
success of accountability politics is demonstrated by Bush’s belief that he was morally obligated 
to help alleviate the suffering as described by global civil society.  Without global civil society 
providing important information and pressure to intervene, intervention would likely never have 
happened.   
 The same can be said for the intervention in Libya.  NGOs and the media were 
instrumental in reporting government attacks and the violence to key decision-makers in the 
government. Reports of government-sponsored air attacks contradicted statements by the 
Defense Department, yet were still able to influence the likes of Samantha Power, John McCain, 
and Susan Rice who all advocated for a no-fly zone.  Additionally, the NTC worked directly with 
Clinton and the State Department to advocate for U.S. intervention, presenting itself as a 
legitimate interlocutor with clear demands that should be listened to.  It called for “freedom” and 
“respect,” values that not only certainly resonated with American decision-makers, but were also 
promised by President Obama in his 2009 Cairo speech to the Muslim World.  Framing the war 
as a violent struggle between freedom and authoritarianism, the NTC and Libyan public were 
able to convince Obama that the U.S. had a moral responsibility to intervene: “acting would be 
the right thing to do, because we have the responsibility to prevent a massacre, and we’ve been 
asked to do it by the people of Libya.” 238 
 Global civil society provided the Bush Administration with important information about 
the humanitarian crisis in Darfur, especially during Khartoum’s information blackout, and was 
successful in influencing American policy.  It also spawned an unprecedented citizen advocacy 	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movement that successfully lobbied Congressmen and the President to act in ways they certainly 
would not have otherwise.  However, it fell short of eliciting intervention for a couple of reasons.  
Firstly, citizen-led advocacy groups, especially the Save Darfur Coalition, had only a general 
understanding of the political forces involved in the conflict and what could be done to stop it.  
Secondly, and more importantly, the citizen-led movement noticeably fell short of calling for 
intervention.  Because of these two reasons, the United States was able to appease advocacy 
demands with markedly limited, and unsuccessful, efforts.  Often, airlifting a few thousand more 
soldiers “with pictures to show for it” was enough to satisfy advocacy demands. 239  In other 
words, the U.S. was not held accountable for not intervening.  My first condition for intervention 
thus went unfulfilled. 
 My second condition for intervention, low relative costs, is also upheld by the cases in 
this study.  Although the Bush Administration was also heavily pressured by global civil society 
to intervene in Bosnia, the low relative costs of the Somalia operation determined that if the 
United States was going to lead any mission, it would be in the Horn of Africa instead of the 
Balkans.  The perceived costs of intervention in Bosnia were simply too great.  Likewise, low 
costs were a prerequisite for intervention in Libya.  Despite Gates’ assertion that the Obama 
Administration ignored military costs, the evidence indicates otherwise.  First, coalition building 
and burden sharing with NATO and the Arab League convinced Obama that intervention was 
plausible.  The President made it clear during negotiations that he would not intervene alone, and 
that the U.S. would scale back its military involvement after the initial bombing campaign as to 
not become entrenched in another Iraq-like quagmire.  Secondly, intervention was conditional on 
a limited mandate that fell short of regime change.  Again, Iraq was the standard to avoid; 
Obama feared that regime change would inevitably require the U.S. to take the lead in the costly 	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post-war transition.  Although the mandate eventually evolved to include removing Qaddafi, and 
the operation lasted over seven months, the evidence suggests that the administration genuinely 
thought the operation would be quick.  In Darfur, the perceived high costs of intervention barred 
military action.  The Defense Department feared that deploying troops in Sudan would either 
stretch the military thin, or require relocating manpower from Iraq and Afghanistan.  Military 
planners deemed intervention too big and too costly to pursue. 
 This study also proves that the U.S. will not intervene in humanitarian crises unless the 
security and strategic implications are benign.  Despite Siad Barre’s blatant human rights abuses 
in the 1980s (although not a humanitarian crisis), the U.S. not only refrained from intervening to 
protect citizens, but also made an effort to maintain positive relations with the regime as a way to 
counter Soviet influence in the region.  After Somalia’s strategic importance diminished after the 
Cold War ended, and the Barre regime fell, the security/strategic implications of intervention 
disappeared and military action became strategically harmless.  In Libya, the U.S. had regional 
support from both the Arab League and the Gulf Cooperation Council, greatly reducing the 
strategic implications that could have otherwise resulted from another intervention in another 
Muslim country.  Additionally, Washington actually strategically benefitted from intervention by 
demonstrating its resolve and by adhering to the image spelled out in Obama’s 2009 speech in 
Cairo.  If the implications had not been benign, the administration would not have intervened.  
On the other hand, decision-makers saw intervention in Darfur as strategically harmful for three 
reasons: it would have compromised operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, it would have 
threatened Sudanese cooperation with American counterterrorism efforts, and it would have 
escalated tensions between the U.S. and the Arab World.  Intervention was therefore out of the 
question. 
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 Individually, each of these conditions is necessary, but not sufficient, for intervention.  
Together, they form a set that is both a necessary and sufficient variable for intervention.  The 
causal relationship can be written as follows: 
 
  
       
 
 
Or, if intervention does not occur, then at least one of the individual conditions of the set is not 
true.  It is interesting to note that in Darfur, none of these conditions was true, making it a 
particularly unfavorable environment for U.S. intervention.  Indeed, the absence of each 
particular condition was used by Washington to justify non-intervention.  
 By identifying the conditions under which states intervene in humanitarian crises, this 
study bridges the gap between realism’s inability to explain the importance of the humanitarian 
norm, and constructivism’s inability to capture states’ “logic of consequences” mentality.  
Clearly, the humanitarian norm influences state behavior.  Despite realism’s assertion that states 
undertake interventions only for self-interested reasons, principally to maximize security or 
power, this study demonstrates that the United States will intervene to uphold values it perceives 
as good and right.  However, while the humanitarian norm certainly influences U.S policy, 
Washington will only intervene in humanitarian crises under favorable conditions.  As realism 
would suggest, the United States makes extremely calculated decisions, carefully examining the 
perceived costs and benefits of intervention, both material and security/strategic related, before 
agreeing to participate in a military effort.  Decision-makers will avoid intervention if they 
Global	  Civil	  Society	  Low	  relative	  material	  costs	  Benign	  security/strategic	  implications	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determine the costs to be too high.  Therefore, the humanitarian norm does matter, but only when 
upholding it does not require the United States to make considerable sacrifices. 
 Additionally, this study demonstrates that the catalyst for putting intervention on the 
agenda as a potential policy option is usually not benevolent policymakers in Washington, but 
global civil society.  The global civil society conglomerate is a dynamic actor that, by providing 
information and pressure upon the government to intervene, can influence policy and convince 
the U.S. to act in ways it would not have otherwise.  This suggests that Washington needs 
prodding to intervene and, as realism indicates, prefers to forego humanitarian intervention if it 
can.  Yet it also shows that the president can be motivated by the humanitarian norm when 
pressured, and can be convinced to pursue policy options that may not be directly beneficial to 
the state.  This reality holds true with constructivism. 
 Both realism and constructivism therefore have important contributions to describing 
state behavior in humanitarian crises.  Yet exclusively, both theories also fall short.  This study 
bridges the gap between realism and constructivism by demonstrating the conditions under 
which norms can compel the United States to undertake costly military operations with few, if 
any, prospects for self-gain.  The humanitarian norm matters, and can influence state behavior, 







Purinton	  93	  	  
Bibliography 
1. Ayittey, George B.N. The Somali Crisis: Time for an African Solution. Washington D.C.: The Cato 
Institute, 1992. 
2. Baum, Matthew A. “How Public Opinion Constrains the Use of Force: The Case of Operation Restore 
Hope,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 34.2 (June, 2004): 187-226 
3. Bellamy, Alex J., and Wheeler, Nicholas J., “Humanitarian Intervention in World Politics” in The 
Globalization of World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations. Edited by John Baylis and 
Steve Smith. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011. 
4.Brown, Seyom. The Illusion of Control: Force and Foreign Policy in the 21st Century. Washington DC: 
Brookings Institute, 2003 
5. Baumann, Robert F., Yates, Lawrence A., and Washington, Versalle F. My Clan Against the World: 
U.S. and Coalition Forces in Somalia 1992-1994. Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute Press, 
2004 
6. Center for Policy Analysis and Research on Refugee Issues. The Somalia Saga: A Personal Account 
1990-1993. By Jan Westcott. Washington D.C.: OFDA, 1994.   
7. Chivvis, Christopher S., Crane, Keith., Mandaville, Peter, and Martini, Jeffrey. “Libya’s Post-Qaddafi 
Transition: The Nation-Building Challenge,” Rand Corporation National Security Research Division, 
2012 Accessed March 5, 2013 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR100/RR129 /RAND_RR129.pdf 
8. Chorin, Ethan. Exit the Colonel: The Hidden History of the Libyan Revolution. New York: Public 
Affairs, 2012 
9. Daadler, Ivo H., and Stavridis, James G. “NATO’s Victory in Libya: The Right Way to Run an 
Intervention. Foreign Affairs 91.2 (March/April 2012) 
10. Desch, Michael. “Culture Clash: Assessing the Importance of Ideas in Security Studies,” International 
Security, 23/1 (1998): 144 
11. Etzioni, Amitai. “The Coming Test of U.S. Credibility.” Military Review (March/April 2011). 
Accessed Accessed February 23, 2014 
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/MilitaryReview/Archives/English/MilitaryReview_2 0110430_art004.pdf 
12. Evans, Gareth. “When is it Right to Fight?” Survival 46.3 (2004): 59-81 
13. Fegley, Randall. Beyond Khartoum: A History of Subnational Government in Sudan. Trenton: The 
Red Sea, 2011. 
14. Finnemore, Martha. The Purpose of Intervention: Changing Belief of the Use of Force. New York: 
Cornell University Press, 2004 
15. Ford, Lucy, “Transnational Actors.” In Global Environmental Politics: Concepts, Theories, and Case 
Studies, edited by Gabriela Kutting. London: Routledge, 2011. 
16. Frye, Alton.  Humanitarian Intervention: Crafting a Workable Doctrine. New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations, 2000. 
Purinton	  94	  	  
 
17. Gates, Robert. Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War. New York: Knopf Doubleday, 2014 
 
18. George, Alexander and Bennett, Andrew. Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences. Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005 
 
19. Gerring, John. “Is there a (Viable) Crucial-Case Method?” Comparative Political Studies 40.3 (2007): 
231-253 
 
20. Gibbs, David N. “Realpolitik and Humanitarian Intervention: The Case of Somalia.” International 
Politics 37. (March 2000). 
 
21. Glanville, Luke. “Somalia Reconsidered: An Examination of the Norm of Humanitarian Intervention.” 
Journal of Humanitarian Assistance (September 2005).  
 
22. Hamilton, Rebecca. Fighting for Darfur: Public Action and the Struggle to Stop Genocide. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2011 
 
23. Hastings, Michael. “Inside Obama’s War Room,” Rolling Stone, October 13, 2011. Accessed March 
11, 2013 http://www.rollingstone.com/politics/news/inside-obamas-war-room-20111013 
 
24. Howard, Lisa Morje. UN Peacekeeping in Civil Wars. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008 
 
25. Human Rights Watch. Somalia: A Government at War with its Own People. New York: Human 
Rights Watch, 1990.  Accessed February 3, 2014 http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/somalia 
_1990.pdf 
 
26. Human Rights Watch. Human Rights Watch World Report: Somalia. New York: Human Rights 
Watch, 1989. Accessed February 3, 2014 http://www.hrw.org/reports/1989/WR89/index.htm#TopOfPage 
 
27. Jervis, Robert. “Cooperation Under the Security Dilemma.” World Politics 30.2 (January 1978): 167-
214 
 
28. Johns, Michael. “Preserving American Security Ties to Somalia.” The Heritage Foundation 
Backgrounder no. 745 (1989). Accessed January 3, 2014  
http://s3.amazonaws.com/t hf_media/1989/pdf/bg 745.pdf  
 
29. Johnson, Douglas.  The Root Causes of Sudan’s Civil Wars: Peace or Truce. Kampala: Fountain 
Publishers, 2011.   
 
30. Keane, John. Global Civil Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003 
 
31. Keane, John and Ikenberry, John G. “Global Civil Society?” Foreign Affairs (2003). Accessed March 
3, 2014 http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/59214/g-john-ikenberry/global-civil-society 
 
32. Keck, Margaret E. and Sikkink, Kathryn. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in 
International Politics. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1998 
 
33. Kuperman, Alan J. “Rwanda in Retrospect.” Foreign Affairs (Janurary/February 2000): 94-118 
 
Purinton	  95	  	  
34. Krieg, Andreas. Motivations for Humanitarian Intervention: Theoretical and Empirical 
Considerations. Dordrecht: Springer Press, 2013 
 
35. Kurth, James. “Humanitarian Intervention post-Iraq: Legal Ideals vs. Military Realities.” Orbis 
(Winter 2006) 
 
36. Levy, Janey. Genocide in Darfur. New York: Rosen Publications, 2009 
 
37. Lofland, Valerie J. “Somalia: US Intervention and Operation Restore Hope,” in Case Studies in 
Policymaking and Implementation. Edited by David A. Williams, 6th edition. Newport: Naval War 
College, 2002 
 
38. Lundestad, Geir. East, West, North, South: Major Developments in International Politics Since 1945. 
London: Sage Publications, 2010.  
 
39. Mamdani, Mahmood. Survivors and Saviors: Darfur, Politics, and the War on Terror. New York: 
Pantheon Books, 2009. 
 
40. Marsh, James and Olsen, Johan. “The Logic of Appropriateness.” In The Oxford Handbook of Public 
Policy, edited by Michael Moran, Michael Rein, and Robert E. Gooden. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2006 
 
41. Mearsheimer, John. The Tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: Horton, 2001. 
 
42. Natsios, Andrew. “Illusions of Influence: The CNN Effect in Complex Emergencies,” in From 
Massacres to Genocide: The Media, Public Policy, and Humanitarian Crises. Edited by Robert I. 
Rotberg and Thomas Weiss. Washington D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1996. 
 
43. Nelson, Paul J. and Dorsey, Ellen. New Rights Advocacy: Changing Strategies of Development and 
Human Rights NGOs. Washington D.C.: Georgetown University Press, 2008 
 
44. Pearson, Frederic S., Baumann, Robert A., and Pickering, Jeffrey J., “Military Intervention and 
Realpolitik.” In Reconstructing Realpolitik, edited by Frank Whelon and Francis Diehl, 205-226. Ann 
Arbor: University of Michigan, 1994 
 
45. Power, Samantha. A Problem from Hell: America and the Age of Genocide, New York: Basic Books, 
2002. 
 
46. Power, Samantha. “Bystanders to Genocide.” The Atlantic. Accessed January 21, 2014 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2001/09/bystanders-to-genocide/304571/ 
 
47. Ronen, Yehudit. Qaddafi’s Libya in World Politics. Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2008 
 
48. Rutherford, Ken. Humanitarianism Under Fire: The U.S. and U.N. Intervention in Somalia. Sterling: 
Kumarian Press, 2008 
 
49. Stoddard, Abby. Humanitarian Alert: NGO Information and its Impact on U.S. Foreign Policy. 
Bloomfield: Kumarian Press, 2006 
 
50. Strobel, Warren. “The CNN Effect.” American Journalism Review (May, 1996) 
 
Purinton	  96	  	  
51. Strobel, Warren. Late Breaking Foreign Policy: The News Media’s Influence on Peace Operations. 
Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 1997 
 
52. Trachtenberg, Marc. “Intervention in Historical Perspective.” In Emerging Norms of Justified 
Intervention, edited by Laura W. Reed and Carl Kaysen, 15-36. Cambridge: American Academy of Arts 
and Sciences, 1993 
 
53. United States Agency for International Development and the Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance. 
Somalia Situation Report No. 17, December 17, 1992. USAID and OFDA. Washington D.C.: USAID, 
1992 
 
54. United States Agency for International Development. Development Disaster: USAID in Somalia 
1978-1990. By Melissa C. Pailthorp. PNABX-503. Washington DC: US Agency for International 
Development, 1994.   
 
55. Valentino, Benjamin A. “The True Costs of Humanitarian Intervention: The Hard Truth about a Noble 
Notion,” Foreign Affairs 90.6 (November/December 2011): 59-73 
 
56. Valentino, Benjamin A. “Still Standing By: Why America and the International Community Fail to 
Prevent Genocide and Mass Killing.” Perspectives on Politics (2003) 
 
57. de Wall, Alex and Flint, Julie. Darfur: A Short History of a Long War. London: Zed Books, 2005 
 
58. de Wall, Alex. “I Will Not Sign.” London Review of Books 28.23 (November 30, 2006). Accessed 
January 23, 2014 http://www.lrb.co.uk/v28/n23/alex-de-waal/i-will-not-sign 
 
59. Western, John. “Sources of Humanitarian Intervention: Beliefs, Information, and Advocacy in the U.S. 
Decisions on Somalia and Bosnia.” International Security 26.4 (Spring, 2002): 112-142 
 
60. Wheeler, Nicholas J. Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 	  
